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LOVE IT OR HATE IT, BUT FOR THE RIGHT
REASONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE NEW
HAVEN SCHOOL’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Hengameh Saberi*
Abstract: This Article presents a novel understanding of pragmatism in
the New Haven School of international law. The New Haven Jurisprudence is wrapped in layers of mystification and the scant accounts of its
pragmatism in the literature are either entirely mistaken or only partially
helpful, betray a vernacular or truncated understanding of pragmatism,
and fail to engage with the internal, epistemic structure of the policyoriented jurisprudence. In response, this Article uncovers a contradictory
form of foundationalist pragmatism in the Yale Jurisprudence in a peculiar
relationship between its contextualist and problem-solving promises and
its unreflective normative commitments to a set of postulated values of
human dignity. In doing so, it foregrounds a “foundationalist antifoundationalism” and its crippling impact on the pragmatist promises of policyoriented jurisprudence. Against the worn-out accusations of the New Haven Jurisprudence of U.S. imperialism or disguised affinity with natural
law, understanding its foundationalist pragmatism offers a new appreciation of both the genius of Yale’s policy-oriented approach and the promises of pragmatism for policy thinking in international law.

Introduction
In 1971, Richard Falk—himself an astute student of the New Haven School of international law (NHS)—predicted that if by 2010 the
world would have overcome “the fundamental challenges of war, pov* Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School; Director, Middle East & Near East Program, Harvard Law School Project on Disability. The author acknowledges with gratitude the unfailing support, advice, and mentorship of David
Kennedy, the intellectual camaraderie of Paulo Barrozo, Lisa Kelly, Vlad Perju, and Mark
Toufayan, and the invaluable comments of Catherine Elgin, Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela,
Duncan Kennedy, and Martti Koskenniemi on various earlier drafts. This work has benefited from presentations at Harvard Law School’s Graduate Program Colloquium, Georgetown University Law Center’s Faculty Workshop: Critical Perspectives on Law, Boston University School of Law’s Faculty Workshop, Boston College Law School’s International Legal
Studies Colloquium, and from the editorial help of the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. All errors are solely the author’s.
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erty, pollution, and oppression,” an historian seeking to “recreate the
intellectual roots of such a positive outcome” could not hope to do better than to explicate the “clarity of vision, seriousness of commitment,
and extent of impact . . .” of the life and work of Professor Myres
McDougal.1 With 2011 already behind us, the historian is hardly so
lucky as to be asked for an account of the intellectual roots of a world
without war, poverty, pollution, and oppression. Despite this, Professor
Myres McDougal’s place in the history of American international law, as
Falk aptly put it, “tower[s] so far above his contemporaries as to be virtually invisible.”2
Like most things in the altitudes of invisibility, however, the policyoriented approach to international law that was born and flourished in
New Haven3 remains, seven decades later, persistently enveloped in
layers of mystification. In its own time, it lived a life of celebrity scholarship—attracting some and repelling many others—in which fiery rebuttals trumped meaningful engagements with critics. In its afterlife, it
earned little more than either overwhelmingly negative or positive accounts of what it was not, or underwhelming appraisal and appreciation of what it was. Reactions to the NHS’s policy approach run the
gamut from critiques that target its theoretical inadequacies or follies
and the threat posed to the rule of law if policy and law were to be so
closely integrated,4 to laudatory commendations of the NHS’s own assertive stance as a comprehensive jurisprudence for a new world public
order of human dignity,5 to enchantment with the NHS’s methodo-

1 Richard Falk, Myres S. McDougal: Pioneer for the Year 2010, 1 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y
13, 15–16 (1971).
2 Id. at 16.
3 See generally Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943) [hereinafter McDougal
& Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy]. Legal Education and Public Policy is the first
collaborative work of Lasswell and McDougal, which in effect set the groundwork for a new
policy-oriented jurisprudence.
4 See discussion infra Part I.
5 For examples of such accounts that address the NHS’s general jurisprudence, without discussing specific doctrinal debates, see, for example, John Morton Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 Va. L. Rev. 662, 688
(1968), who suggests that the jurisprudential canvass into the Lasswell-McDougal project is
among the most rewarding endeavors in legal thought, and Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven
School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 Yale Stud.
World Pub. Ord. 1, 46 (1974), who argues that the NHS “has aided contemporary scholars and decisionmakers alike to construct adequate tools for the study of the interrelations
of law and the world social process.”
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logical heresy of weaving policy into the fabric of law without actually
adopting that methodology in any identifiable form or substance.6
This Article aims to break through the by-now solidified walls of
misperception around Yale’s policy-oriented jurisprudence, dispel
some of the accepted wisdom about its foundations and nature, and
present a more nuanced, dispassionate, and plausible understanding of
its epistemological commitments and methodological claims. For all
their differences, critics and admirers of the New Haven Jurisprudence
agree about at least one fundamental assumption: that New Haven’s
policy-oriented approach and its avowed antifoundationalism are consistent with the teachings of American pragmatism. This Article challenges the accepted wisdom about pragmatism in the NHS and offers a
more accurate reading of its antifoundationalism. It does so because
the peculiar relationship between pragmatism and human dignity in
the NHS not only defined the fate of its career during and after the
Cold War, but continues to bear crucial implications for the life of international law in the United States. A fresh and accurate understanding of the pragmatist and policy-oriented jurisprudence of the international law of human dignity, therefore, through its historical
significance, opens up new avenues for a realistic assessment of international law’s vocation, limits, and potential in the twenty-first century.
As any cursory review of American legal thought confirms, Professor McDougal and Harold Lasswell’s collaborative project transcends
international law into the wider space of jurisprudence, introducing a
configurative and sophisticated theoretical framework to advance human dignity in a free society.7 History, however, evidently had a different
course plotted for the success and reception of Yale’s policy science jurisprudence. The Lasswell-McDougal project is known as “the first
American attempt to conceive of . . . lawyering—legal teaching, research, practice and decision-making—as an overtly political endeavor.”8
Pedagogical reconstruction was, therefore, the first platform on which
the NHS hoped to construct an image of the politically conscious lawyer

6 This view is best reflected in the general, but unenunciated, understanding of the
NHS as an all-encompassing, oceanic movement that has altered the discipline such that it
is simply no longer possible to think of international law in pre-McDougalian terms.
7 See generally Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a
Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy (1992) [hereinafter McDougal &
Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society].
8 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 164 (1995).
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as a lawyer of human dignity.9 The American system of legal education,
however, was not persuaded to train lawyers as policy scientists in order
to advance the normative goals of human dignity or universal democracy.10 Nor was international law—the discipline the Lasswell-McDougal
collaboration in effect spent its entire career to reform—enticed by the
configurative methodology of policy science. In fact, as will be outlined
in Part I below, contemporaneous reactions to the NHS’s interdisciplinary project ranged from agnosticism to outright rejection, rendering
the NHS the most visible, but ultimately the least influential, midtwentieth century project of disciplinary renewal.11
Later interdisciplinary proposals for an international law geared
toward post-Cold War challenges and opportunities were also not
aligned with Yale’s policy-oriented methodology. One would have expected the post-Cold War reemergence of enthusiasm about the potential of political science to enrich international law to exhibit, beyond
reverence for empirical research, a more meaningful methodological
affinity with or understanding of the elaborate application of policy
science in the New Haven Jurisprudence. Aside from an implicit regard
for the pioneering work of McDougal, however, the international relations rescue mission lacked the sophistication of Yale’s configurative
and multidisciplinary approach, remaining content to set up international law with quantitative ambitions.12 This was, after all, “a new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship.”13 The other feasible suspect to
9 Hence, the first Lasswell-McDougal work was devoted to a comprehensive plan for
legal education. See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at
206.
10 For the best account of the failure of the NHS’s educational program, see Laura
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, at 184–85 (2001), which details the opposition to the Lasswell-McDougal proposal in the general perception of policy science as being too costly and academic, and just elitist. Interestingly, McDougal himself blamed the
failure of educational institutions to adopt the policy-oriented approach on timing, rather
than institutional constraints:
We got much more attention than we wanted before we wanted it . . . . We
thought we’d have several years to formulate the stuff and write it up before
we got too much attention, but we got too much success too quickly to serve
intellectual purposes, and then we got the reaction.
Id. at 185 (quoting an interview with McDougal).
11 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall
of International Law 1870–1960, at 475 (2002).
12 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998) (exploring the intersection of international law and international relations and specifically
the use of international relations theory to solve various international legal problems).
13 Id. at 393.
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carry the NHS’s torch would have been Critical Legal Studies (CLS) or
its offspring, which share to an equal degree McDougal’s skepticism
about the law’s autonomy.14 But this shared epistemological view about
the law and its indeterminacy provides a very thin genealogical relation
between CLS and the NHS, considering that CLS would cringe both at
New Haven’s commitment to a scientific approach to decision-making
and at the significant, overdetermining role of its normative fidelity to
human dignity for legal outcomes.15
Even through its brightest chance for resurrection or comprehension in the twenty-first century as “a ‘new’ New Haven School,”16 the
NHS has been taken merely to inspire a pluralistic platform against the
reductionism of rational choice theory,17 to delineate the complexity of
diverse world public orders in a new age,18 or to question, in a way that
does little to enhance our understanding of the NHS, the Lasswell14 See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession 201–02 (1993) (suggesting that the seeds of CLS could be found in Lasswell
and McDougal’s first collaborative work).
15 See, e.g., James Boyle, Ideals and Things: Legal Scholarship and the Prison-House of Language, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 327, 343 (1985) (“To claim that one can inject a universal value
(‘human dignity’) into an avowedly means-end technique is a contradiction in terms. For
this to become one of the dominant approaches to international law is a travesty.”).
McDougal himself also spoke of the differences between the NHS and CLS:
We seek more emphasis upon deliberate creation and appreciation of policy
than most prior framers of jurisprudence and we recognize the need for a
comprehensive, integrated set of values to achieve this emphasis. It is here
that we differ from the Critical Legal Studies people . . . [W]e try to be constructive as well as destructive.
Letter from Myres S. McDougal to Neil Duxbury (Feb. 14, 1990), quoted in Duxbury, supra
note 8, at 194–95 n.189.
16 Lauren E. Baer & Stephen M. Ruckman, Foreward to Symposium, The “New” New Haven School: International Law—Past, Present & Future, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 299, 299 (2007).
17 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l
L. 301, 305–11 (2007) (linking the Lasswell-McDougal emphasis on law as social process to
Robert Cover’s legal pluralism and finding its synthesis in Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the
New Haven School of International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 393, 396–98, 408–10 (2007)
(comparing the old NHS’s stance against the realists and positivists of its time to the New
NHS’s invocation of bottom-up rulemaking against contemporary neo-sovereigntists);
Dakota S. Rudesill, Note, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational Military Technology
and the Duty of Care Under Laws of War, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 517, 543–44 (2007) (tangentially
referring to the old NHS while tackling norm diffusion in the laws of war to fit into the
New NHS symposium theme).
18 See Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and Normative
Friction, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 331, 359–61 (2007) (arguing for the conceptual complexity of
world public order and suggesting ways the NHS can build on some of its original insights
to capture the new realities of the time).
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McDougal quest for scientific precision in legal decision-making as the
specific product of its time and space.19 An amalgam of heterogeneous
projects, the “new” New Haven School reaches out to different parts of
the proverbial elephant in the dark, to pay respect to a shared geographical locale, rather than to find inspiration in the epistemological,
methodological, or normative insights of the Lasswell-McDougal project.
If international law as a whole in the United States was not enlightened by the New Haven Jurisprudence, why, then, does McDougal’s policy-oriented approach warrant a new reading? Two reasons
connected to the internal structure of policy-oriented jurisprudence
not only justify, but demand, a new assessment of this mid-twentieth
century genius of U.S. international legal thinking. First, the NHS’s
policy approach to international law is symbolic of how Americans predominantly engage with (or disengage from) international law with a
more flexible, policy-conscious, contextualist, and problem-solving attitude. In general, the association of American theories of international
law with the Yale approach often has overestimating undertones that
are both negative and positive. On the negative side, Yale—and thus
any form of policy analysis, as opposed to purely legalistic arguments—
is blamed for reflecting an ill disposition for easily breaking the law in
the name of balancing conflicting policies.20 On the positive side, even
its detractors, who deny it the exalted status of “jurisprudence,” acknowledge that “[o]ne can hardly participate in modern international
law scholarship without a background in ‘policy science.’”21 A more
profound understanding of the internal structure, epistemological
claims and function, and methodological and normative commitments
of the NHS is required to reject the simplistic association of this policyoriented approach with U.S. foreign policy interests to bring about the
demise of international law. Likewise, given that even the “new” New
19 Rebecca M. Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Environmental Law: A
Process-Oriented Inquiry into Sustainable Development, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 363, 366 (2007).
20 See, e.g., Brad Roth, Bending the Law, Breaking It, or Developing It? The United States and
the Humanitarian Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, in United States Hegemony and the
Foundations of International Law 232, 249–50 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds.,
2003) (“At its worst, the policy-oriented approach equates law with justice as interpreted by
the strong.”). Recognizing the policy-oriented approach as neither uniquely American nor
merely a divisive apology to justify U.S. foreign policy interests, Roth still believes that it
“remains a controversial mode of legal analysis, especially among those who seek to maintain a critical perspective on U.S. actions.” Id. at 250.
21 Brian Leiter, Is There an ‘American’ Jurisprudence?, 17 Oxford J.L. Stud. 367, 369
(1997).
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Haven School barely resembles McDougal’s policy science except in
geographic name, against the fantastic and overblown description of
the NHS as a gateway to “modern international law scholarship,” a
more realistic account of McDougal’s legacy for international law is
long overdue.
Understanding that legacy is beyond the ambit of this Article.22
But to understand that invisible yet extraordinary and long-enduring
impact, as opposed to the banal visibility often afforded the NHS, it is
first crucial to cast the principal epistemic claims of the NHS—those
suggesting the influence of pragmatism—in a new light. These two
constitutive pragmatist claims are contextualism and problem-solving
orientation. To grasp their origin, function, and implications for Yale’s
international law of human dignity, one must properly locate McDougal’s intellectual pedigree.
Widely held and deeply ingrained in international lawyers’ consciousness, but never methodically delineated,23 is a belief that the NHS
has deep roots in American Legal Realism.24 Upon further examination, however, “McDougal’s realist sentiments” irretrievably give way to
the force of Lasswell’s policy science.25 Acknowledging the exceedingly
strong and determinative influence of Lasswellian policy science on the
New Haven Jurisprudence, compared to currently unexplored traces of
Legal Realism, is the long neglected key that will open new avenues for
a better understanding of the real place and disciplinary legacy of the
NHS in international law.
How so? As I will argue, there is a peculiar interaction between the
scientific and normative commitments in the New Haven Jurisprudence, in which the strenuous standards of empirical analysis it prescribes (or any other form of inquiry for that matter) do not apply to
22 See Hengameh Saberi, The New Haven School’s Soliloquy: Banal Visibility and Invisible Impact (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). Here I suggest that in fact the NHS, through its interaction with its contemporaneous mainstream international law discipline, induced a new consciousness about “policy
thinking” that still haunts international legal discourse in the United States.
23 For a notable exception, see generally William Morison, Myres S. McDougal and Twentieth-Century Jurisprudence: A Comparative Essay, in Toward World Order and Human Dignity
3 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976). As the only extensive comparative
jurisprudential study of the NHS, Morison’s essay reads McDougal against a number of twentieth-century schools of thought and not merely Legal Realism. As such, his analysis of the
NHS’s realist roots is theme selective and, inevitably, limited in scope.
24 Cf. Duxbury, supra note 8, at 170 (stating that Lasswell and McDougal found legal
realism to be inadequate and thus attempted to move American jurisprudence away from
the traditional methods of legal realism).
25 Id. at 167–68.
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the normative values of human dignity. Human dignity, therefore, takes
the form of an overarching and determinative element in legal decision-making, while its substance consists of a set of homegrown value
postulates that reflect the parochial normative worldview of the New
Haven masters. The form and substance of human dignity, defined as
such, bear significant consequences for the fundamental epistemic
claims of the policy-oriented approach—the claims that putatively make
the NHS a genus of pragmatism. What remains of the pragmatist promises of contextualism and problem-solving orientation, in the face of
what ultimately is a foundational faith in the essence and determining
role of human dignity, is no more than a semblance of pragmatism, if
one recognizes antifoundationalism as the cardinal epistemic building
block of pragmatism. New Haven’s antifoundationalism, in the final
analysis, is not without foundations of its own. This foundationalist antifoundationalism becomes not only the hallmark of policy-oriented jurisprudence, aligning it with the foreign policy interests of the leader of
the free world, but also the explanatory force behind international
law’s reaction to the role of policy versus law for many years to come.
To make sense of New Haven’s foundationalist pragmatism—a
contradiction by nature with grand consequences—one should flex the
commonly held assumption about the force of realist jurisprudence on
Yale’s collaborative renewal project in international law. The LasswellMcDougal project sought a new and receptive disciplinary home in international law for Lasswell’s policy science and a counterpart for the
policy scientist of democracy in the international lawyer of human dignity. Reading the foundationalist antifoundationalism of Yale under the
shade of Lasswell’s pedigree affords a breeze of sympathy toward
McDougal’s vision for a policy-oriented international law, vindicating it
from the unsophisticated accusations of legitimization and hasty critiques that have failed to follow or engage with the internal logic of the
New Haven Jurisprudence.
To offer a new understanding of New Haven’s pragmatism for an
international law of human dignity, this Article proceeds as follows. In
Part I, I map the discipline’s reactions to the Lasswell-McDougal project
to illustrate that, regardless of the nature of objections, the literature has
unanimously entertained an external critique of the Yale approach
without a trace of attention to its epistemic claims and a critical assessment of their function and success in delivering what they promise. Part
II reviews the sketchy accounts of New Haven’s pragmatism in the literature and suggests that they lack a philosophical understanding of pragmatism, and thus adopt, at best a truncated, and at worst a vernacular,
usage of the term. The centerpiece of the argument advanced here,
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Parts III and IV, instead take contextualism and problem-solving orientation as the two core claims of the New Haven Jurisprudence that bear
significant epistemological implications for policy-oriented approach
and re-assess their success in light of the normative commitments of the
New Haven masters. By dissecting the function of New Haven’s contextualism and problem-solving orientation and their interaction with the
central role of human dignity in legal decision-making, I aim to foreground and make sense of the NHS’s foundationalist antifoundationalism or pragmatism. Part V concludes the argument.
Rather than intend to discover the “real” New Haven Jurisprudence, or propose an affirmative account of what a plausibly pragmatist
international law of human dignity (or any other normative agenda)
ought to look like,26 this Article takes apart some of the fundamental,
but misguided and misleading, understandings of Yale’s policy approach, of pragmatism, and ultimately of policy thinking in international law. As the existing literature bears evidence, no account of the
career of the Lasswell-McDougal project and its legacy for international
law would take off successfully amid the fog that still surrounds the epistemic and methodological tenets of policy science. This is neither
about saving Yale’s policy-oriented approach nor about venerating the
tradition of pragmatism, but rather a first attempt at taking stock of
what really went on in the Lasswell-McDougal heresy in order to establish solid ground for a more accurate understanding of how this midtwentieth century revolutionary project of disciplinary renewal speaks
to us today.
I. New Haven’s Policy-Oriented International Law and the
Panorama of Agnosticism
In its own time, the policy-oriented approach of the NHS faced
general resistance. This resistance at first appears to derive from a
commonly shared source of disciplinary anxiety among international
lawyers of the time about the methodological novelty so passionately
advocated by Lasswell and McDougal. Under the New Haven account,
international law faced a choice between, on the one hand, a multidisciplinary project of renewal with a sophisticated scientific apparatus
and clear normative commitments, and on the other hand, stagnation
and a naïve hope in the autonomy of the rule of law.27
26 The latter project would be a worthwhile endeavor and certainly deserves its own
space. That will not, however, be here.
27 See, e.g., McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 237.
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This picture, however, is too general and too vague to reflect the
complete story of the discipline’s reception of a policy-oriented international law of human dignity. The ill fate of the democratic science of
international law envisioned by the NHS may be attributed, in varying
degrees, to a wide variety of factors, such as: institutional constraints,
unfavorable timing, McDougal’s complex language and style, international lawyers’ impatience with New Haven’s scientific accuracy and
technical vocabulary, agnosticism about the practical value of employing scientific language, resistance against a disciplinary renewal generally perceived as either unnecessary or incomprehensible, anxiety
about the certainty of the law and the professional image of the lawyer
giving in to the professional identity of the policy scientist of democracy, and a mutual sense of alienation between the old and the new.
An historiographical attempt to understand the career of the NHS
must weigh all these explanations and possibly discover more. But the
map of contemporaneous reactions to McDougal’s policy-oriented heresy here has a different purpose. It presents a synopsis of what was in
debate in order to illustrate what was not. Agnostic reactions to McDougal’s proposal, in all their variations, focused on an external critique to
target its ideological implications, its view of law and power, and its
complex style and language.28 As manifested by this map, none took any
interest in the internal, epistemic structure of the New Haven Jurisprudence.
The map below sketching popular skepticism against the NHS is
admittedly simplified to some degree. Any effort to thread various interpretations of the methodological renewal of the NHS inevitably disregards some nuances in the interest of making sense of a common disciplinary spirit. In fact, the prevalent strands of skepticism about the
New Haven Jurisprudence never quite converged on what they found
most problematic with the policy-oriented approach; nor did the New
Haven masters take the various objections they faced seriously enough
to engage in a dynamic and linear series of debates and methodically
classify the arguments of their skeptics. This lack of genuine communication may explain why all the negative reactions to the policy-oriented
approach remained external to the NHS’s epistemic structure.

28 See discussion infra Parts I.A.–C.
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A. Policy-Orientation and Legitimization
The first set of critiques of the methodological renewal and normative commitment of the NHS derives from blanket skepticism about the
political orientation and intellectual independence of the New Haven
masters. By focusing on the American character of their policy approach
to legal decision-making, these readings of Lasswell and McDougal begin with an assumption about New Haven’s partiality for U.S. dominance during the Cold War. These assumptions are specifically illustrated in different aspects of the configurative jurisprudence in which
policy considerations must determine legal outcomes. Though not always to an equal degree, the skepticism appears to be cast over the mere
plausibility of the scientific claims and the possibility of consensus over
the specific normative commitments of the New Haven Jurisprudence
on the one hand, and the particular application of those scientific
methods and the interpretation of the accompanying normative commitments on the other.
Some simply remain unconvinced by the Yale School’s claims to
scientific objectivity. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the
plausibility of scientific objectivity or the failure of McDougal and his
associates to apply those standards to actual legal problems is truly in
question when, for instance, Leo Gross speaks of “the policy-science
approach to international law which disguises policy in a pseudoscientific
apparatus of procedures for determining what the law is.”29 At the center
of the scientific teachings of policy sciences to promote objectivity lie
the “maintenance of clarity in observational standpoint,” “[t]he delimitation of an appropriate focus of inquiry,” and the “performance of
intellectual tasks.”30 These three principles aim to define precisely the
relationship of the scholar to the legal problem at hand—the question
of who is analyzing what and how.31 The identification of the scholar or
policy scientist with a particular class, culture, and nation-state significantly impacts the way she formulates the question and seeks the answers. Even more important is the professional role the international
29 Leo Gross, Editorial Comment, Hans Kelsen, 67 Am. J. Int’l L. 491, 499 (1973) (emphasis added).
30 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & Michael W. Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int’l L. 188, 199–200 (1968)
[hereinafter McDougal et al., Theories About International Law].
31 Frederick Samson Tipson, Consolidating World Public Order: The American Study
of International Law and the Work of Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, 1906–
1976, at 44 (May 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file
with Alderman Library, University of Virginia).
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law scholar adopts, either consciously or unconsciously. McDougal,
Lasswell, and Reisman contrast the “scholarly observer” with the “active
decision-maker,”32 a distinction that, despite being oversimplified,33 is
nevertheless a testament to the importance of defining a precise observational standpoint in order to maintain objectivity.
The oversimplification of a divide between scholarly pondering
and decision-making is even more evident when one considers that,
within each category, the questions of contentment with status quo or a
desire for change—and, for scholars, the task of accommodating an
intellectual, social, and political orientation through a congenial jurisprudential approach—complicate the clarification of the observational
standpoint far more than the policy sciences appear to recognize. To be
sure, McDougal clearly recognizes that his own specific vocational, stylistic, community, national and international affiliations shape and constrain his vision, and that distinguishing between individual inclinations
and common interests of mankind is a matter of exercise and persistence.34 Such a clarification demands careful psychological self-analysis.
Identifying the footprints of culture, class, and personality in Lasswell’s
schema, and defining a particular professional role with respect to the
analysis of the problem under investigation, requires a stronger faith in
psychology than lawyers generally find persuasive.
Even if, in principle, psychology and observation of the self were
granted the scrutinizing power that Lasswell recommends to the policy
scientist and that McDougal borrows for the international lawyer, Lasswell and McDougal’s application of the test of rationality to their own
work and their resistance to the impacts of class, personality and culture were less than successful. In fact, some sympathetic readers find
that the alleged objectivity in observational standpoint falls short not in
the usefulness of the concept itself, but in the New Haven masters’
overestimation of their own rationality in adhering to that first element
of objectivity.35 McDougal’s reliance on “reasonableness,” the “wider
shaping and sharing” of values, and “minimum world public order” as
working criteria to deduce specific desired results from general principles such as “community policy” and “human dignity” poses a difficult

32 McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 199.
33 See, e.g., William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 285–89
(1973).
34 See Myres S. McDougal, Remarks, in The Law of the Sea: A New Geneva Conference 179, 179–80 (L. Alexander ed., 1972), cited in Tipson, supra note 31, at 232.
35 See, e.g., Tipson, supra note 31, at 235–37.
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challenge to his claim of rationality and his extensive survey of trends
and conditioning factors in different contexts.36
Take, for instance, McDougal’s justification of American hydrogen
bomb tests based on “established community expectations.”37 The
community expectations favoring the unrestricted right of the United
States to conduct a series of hydrogen bomb tests derive from three factors: the absence of an absolute resolution between mare liberum and
mare clausum claims; the universal right of defense against external security threats, which extends to nuclear testing in preparation for selfdefense; and the vote of the Trusteeship Council of the 1947 Trusteeship Agreement governing the American control of the Marshall Islands, which recognized the right to nuclear testing as an extension of
the Trustee’s authority.38 The quick path of reasoning from “community expectations” to the specific, undisputed right of the United States
to nuclear testing runs afoul of contextual-orientation methodology
with respect to the absence of empirical evidence regarding general
community expectations and the opinions of world elites.39 Considering that McDougal and his associates start from an anarchical assumption about international relations to make a case for the seriousness of
security threats, an appeal to “community expectations” —including
the opinion of those with no interest in the “wider shaping and sharing” of values and those who stand in opposition to the “minimum
world public order” —would be meaningless.40 One also must wonder
about McDougal’s reliance on the vote of the Trusteeship Council;
elsewhere he is clear that “the presumed congruence of formal and
actual authority of intergovernmental organizations may or may not be
sustained by the concurrence of expectations necessary to justify a
claim of actual constitutive authority.”41 Here, an “effective decision”
overrides an “authoritative decision.”42 With that said, given the subjec36 See id. at 235–36.
37 Robert Wood, Public Order and Political Integration in Contemporary International Theory,
14 Va. J. Int’l L. 423, 437 (1974); see Myres S. McDougal & Norbert Schlei, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648, 679 (1955) [hereinafter McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests].
38 Wood, supra note 37, at 437–38; see McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, supra note 37, at 650, 678.
39 Wood, supra note 37, at 437–38.
40 See McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, supra note 37, at 650.
41 Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1
The Future of the International Legal Order 73, 80 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A.
Falk eds., 1969).
42 Wood, supra note 37, at 438. Similar challenges have been posed to other works of
McDougal and his associates that apply general principles of “reasonableness,” “commu-
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tivity of independent states’ determination of perceived threats, it is
curious that McDougal expects such determinations to pass the test of
“reasonableness” so smoothly.
It is, then, the speedy descent from the high ground of general
principles to the valley of “self-evident” results that betrays sheer disregard for detailed contextual analysis and, understandably if not justifiably, gives rise to suspicion of McDougal’s uncritical acceptance of the
views of the policy elite.43 To one commentator, “the impact of these
implicit normative premises [of human dignity] on McDougal’s thinking about substantive issues, despite his self-conscious concern with values in the formulation of his conceptual framework, constitutes a striking confirmation of the subtle impact of underlying values in all
intellectual endeavor.”44 A more scathing review goes so far as to reduce the entire scientific and normative enterprise of the policy sciences to no more than the crude material interest of the United States:
“Law is policy. Policy is human dignity. Human dignity is fostered in the
long run by the success of American foreign policy. Therefore, law is
the handmaiden of the national interest of the United States.”45
Stanley Hoffmann considers the problem to result from McDougal’s definition of the values of human dignity in a manner overlapping
with the American national interest in the face of Communism.46 This
critique is neither against the proposed (pseudo)scientific recommendations of policy sciences, nor against its normative commitment to
human dignity per se, but rather against the precise way in which these

nity expectations,” etc., to secure the interest of the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
Tipson argues that this inconsistency is present in several of McDougal's works. See Tipson,
supra note 31, at 235–36. For examples of these inconsistencies, see generally, Myres S.
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 597, 603 (1963)
[hereinafter McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine]; Myres S. McDougal & Richard M.
Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiated
Solution, 60 Am. J. Int’l L. 671 (1966); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia
and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1968)
[hereinafter McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations].
43 See Oran Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S.
McDougal, 66 Am. J. Int’l L. 60, 74–75 (1972) (“McDougal has leaned towards a somewhat
uncritical acceptance of the views of the American ‘establishment’ on a number of specific
issues in the field of international relations.”).
44 Id. at 75.
45 Stanley Anderson, A Critique of Professor Myres S. McDougal’s Doctrine of Interpretation by
Major Purposes, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 378, 382 (1963).
46 Stanley Hoffmann et al., Mild Reformist and Mild Revolutionary, 24 J. Int’l Aff. 118,
120 (1970).
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goals are defined and applied to any number of particular cases to determine outcomes.47
In what is perhaps sacrilegious treatment of policy sciences’ democratic commitments, some consider the Yale School’s application of contextual-orientation methodology and the Soviet doctrine of co-existence
to be essentially two sides of the same coin.48 Equally repugnant to the
praxis-attentiveness of policy science is the haziness in McDougal’s distinction between the professional roles of scholar and policy-maker, and
a call for intellectual or theoretical purity. In Hoffmann’s words:
[The scholar’s] primary duty, in our discipline as in all others,
is to seek knowledge and understanding for their own sake.
This implies that the main purpose of research should not be
“policy scientism.” The fighting of crusades, the desire to advise policy-makers, or the scholar’s dedication to national or
international causes can and perhaps even should be the occasion, but they should not be the purpose, of theoretical research.49
In essence, Hoffmann applauds the definition of observational
standpoint in the interest of knowledge for the sake of knowledge.50
Hankering after pure knowledge, however, only turns upside down the
contribution of generations of American social thinkers—from pragmatists to the progressives of the early and mid-twentieth century, including policy scientists. McDougal’s clarification of observational
standpoint does not detach theory from praxis or knowledge from action. Rather, as unrealistic a demand as it is, it is meant to make the
47 Id.
48 E.g., Leon Lipson, International Law, in 8 Handbook of Political Science: International Politics 415, 430–34 (Fred Greenstein & Nelson Polsby eds., 1975), cited in
Tipson, supra note 31, at 233–34.
49 Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations 10
(1960). Hoffmann continues: “[T]he distinction between ‘what is worth knowing intellectually and what is useful for practice,’ between understanding and doctoring, remains
essential, both for practical and for ethical reasons.” Id. Richard Falk, in the interest of
developing a theory of international law, also suggests that the jurisdiction of the theorist
and the adversary be separated:
[R]ecognizing the difficulty of making engineering applications of high-order
legal abstractions, . . . the theorist [ought to] refrain from participation in adversary arenas (and, ideally, . . . an adversary [should] refrain from entering
scholarly arenas), or at least that the nature of participation in legal debate
[should] be clearly labeled.
Richard A. Falk, The Status of Law in International Society 17 (1970).
50 See Hoffman, supra note 49, at 10.
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scholar aware, vis-à-vis her inquiry, of her integrated identity and identification assumptions, and the particular professional position she takes.
In fact, McDougal’s clarification is intended to help achieve the everdesired objectivity and scientific knowledge at the service of practical
problems. It is one thing to point to the illusory nature of such a level
of objectivity, but an entirely different thing to blame McDougal’s partiality to U.S. national interests on this straddling of the scholarly and
decision-making positions.51
The divergent characters and intellectual orientation of Lasswell
and McDougal provide another basis for criticism of a credible standpoint in their collaboration.52 Behind the New Haven Jurisprudence,
stands Lasswell—a scientific-minded, “insatiable” pioneer in “total
comprehension” of social affairs, who is called “the ideal of the omniscient scientist” —and McDougal— “the ideal of the irrebuttable advocate, the tireless persuader or persistent proselyte,” who never misses an
opportunity to channel solutions for any problems to the cause of human dignity as he defines it.53 The dual nature of policy sciences reflect
the differences of two minds or two temperaments, that of a scientist
and that of an advocate.54 Under this reading, the advocacy side of
Yale’s configurative jurisprudence blunts its scientific edge because it
either provides direction or manipulates results to fit the NHS’s desired
outcomes.55 Thus, in plain disregard of the postulated normative values
advocated by policy sciences, objectivity claims lose credibility in light of
the policy-oriented approach’s overestimation of its own objectivity.
In sum, whether it is the adulterated scientific objectivity of policy
sciences, its masters’ conflated observational standpoints (despite their
51 Richard Falk, in fact, finds McDougal’s insistence on policy explication to have a
necessarily radicalizing impact, which disqualifies international lawyers as mere professional technicians, particularly at the service of governments and corporations. See Richard
Falk, The Place of Policy in International Law, 2 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 29, 32 (1972).
52 See Tipson, supra note 31, at 236.
53 See id. at 236–37. Lasswell himself refers to this difference:
Luckily our preferred frames of thought, though complementary, are not the
same. McDougal loves verbal combat, especially in the frame of a prescriptive
system and an appellate court. So far as I am concerned, most combat is boring and time-wasting. My preference is inquiry into factual causes and consequences. We are aware of these differences and deliberately exploit the intellectual tensions that result.
Harold Lasswell, In Collaboration with McDougal, 1 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 17, 19 (1971).
54 See Tipson, supra note 31, at 237.
55 But see Anderson, supra note 45, at 382–83 (arguing that “Professor McDougal’s approach is coherent, and is not simply the intrusion of advocacy into scholarship,” but nevertheless going on to reject it as an extra-juristic system).
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recommendations for defining a credible standpoint), the centrality of
human dignity in determining legal outcomes, the definition of human
dignity in a way to converge with American foreign policy interests, or a
disharmonious collaboration of two opposing personalities, the first
group of critiques follows a straightforward explanation and views the
policy-oriented international law as a project devised to maintain and
legitimize the U.S. national interest.
B. Policy-Orientation and the Reduction of Law to Power
The second series of critiques concerns the project’s broad definition of the social processes that define law. These objections run the
gamut from direct opposition to debasing law with politics, to a significantly more sophisticated and widespread challenge to the actual application of the configurative methods of a policy-oriented international
law. The blanket rejection of the intrusion of politics and policy into law
came either from international lawyers avowedly associated with positivism or from commentators within the neighboring discipline of international relations who placed too much hope in a romanticized conception of law as taming the political realities of interstate relations.
To those associated with a positivist foundation of law, the NHS
inherited “all the faults of American ‘legal realism.’”56 In McDougal’s
refutation of legal normativity, law, as they saw it, was no more than a
“euphemism.”57 International law, in comparison to other fields of law,
is more susceptible to politicization and yields more easily to arbitrary
interpretations. Legal realism’s strike, therefore, as reflected in the policy-oriented approach, was an existential threat that sacrificed law for
propaganda: “Other more hardy areas of the law may have been able to
withstand the idolaclastic onslaughts of legal realism. If international
law is moribund, it would be better to bury it forthrightly than to have
it cannibalized by the realistic school for digestion into propaganda.”58
Wolfgang Friedmann, however, questioned whether McDougal, by defining a set of policy goals and values that shaped the direction of international law, adopted a “value philosophy” that alienated a great majority of legal realists.59 These goals and values of “an ‘inclusive’ order
of human dignity” have the flaws of “natural law ideology” and “can, at
56 See Josef L. Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations 169 (1968).
57 See Anderson, supra note 45, at 382.
58 Id. at 383.
59 See generally Wolfgang Friedmann, Law and Minimum World Public Order and the Public
Order of the Oceans, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 606 (1964) (book review).
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best, outline the conditions of an international law of cooperation, not
those of the international law of coexistence.”60 The manner in which
McDougal fuses law and policy, Friedmann argues, runs the risk of rendering international law merely a convenient instrument of national
policy.61 Followed to its logical conclusion, McDougal’s doctrine, in
which the standpoint of the policy-maker vis-à-vis human dignity determines legal outcomes, “is ultimately destructive of any ‘minimum
world order.’”62 Although this might be affirmation of Dean Acheson’s
remarks on the irrelevance of international law to national survival,63
its gravity and risks to a minimum world order as the precondition to
developing goals of human dignity should not be lost on McDougal,
who genuinely believed in the relevance of international law to ensure
the survival of mankind and to promote human dignity.64
Taking the criticism to its limits, Anthony D’Amato challenges New
Haven’s policy-oriented international law on two counts.65 The first and
most fundamental problem lies in McDougal’s equation of reasonableness with legality.66 The broad test of reasonableness applied by
McDougal, along with the breadth of contextual factors recommended
for consideration and the significance of strict adherence to the specificities of context replaces the predictability of law with “psychological
debility of ex post facto rationalization.”67 If McDougal’s approach is to
be accepted, there is a danger of changing legal thinking “from the
propounding of broad beneficial conventions and improvement of existing rules to the detailed rationalizing of the factors of specific cases.”68 The erosion of rigid rules would in turn lead to a clash of international claims that “otherwise would never arise.”69 The second
problem would be loss of respect for the rule of law if general applicability and precedent were sacrificed in the interest of the specific conditions of each new context.70 On a practical level, decision-makers would
60 Id. at 613.
61 Id. at 608.
62 Id.
63 See Dean Acheson, Remarks, Panel: Cuban Quarantine: Implications for the Future, 57 Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 13, 14 (1963).
64 See Friedmann, supra note 59, at 608.
65 See Anthony D’Amato, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 458, 460–61 (1961) (reviewing
Studies in World Public Order (Myres S. McDougal ed., 1960)).
66 Id. at 460.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 460–61.
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always face a choice between equally reasonable claims.71 Absent at
least a few rigid rules, power would inevitably write the rules of the
game.72 To assume that the remedy is in reciprocity, as McDougal does,
merely speaks of hankering after an image of utopia.73
Starting from a practical orientation and moving within a different
line of argument from the positivist concern with delimiting law, Richard Posner took issue with McDougal’s reliance on customary international law in outer space.74 In Posner’s view, McDougal’s elaboration on
both the implications of uniform rules of access and competence in
space and the significance of the Soviet Union’s past practice was irrelevant and confused.75 That McDougal put the onus on the Soviet
Union to prove the lawfulness of its potential exercise of exclusive
competence over the spacecraft of other states in light of its history of
acquiescence to the freedom of space so far as peaceful vehicles were
concerned betrayed a confusion between law, power politics, and mankind’s ideals of a rational world order.76 To speak of custom in the area
of outer space—the vital national interest of the two superpowers “in
the academic and even casuistic fashion” of McDougal and his associates—was to lose sight of the difference between law, power, and universal aspirations toward peace and justice.77 “These areas may overlap
and interpenetrate, but they are not the same.”78 McDougal’s use of
custom in a field as exotic as outer space operates in a fantasy world
wherein law and power are one and the same.79
Longing for legal distinctiveness in terms no more compromising
than the positivists, Stanley Hoffman pronounced that the NHS did its

71 See D’Amato, supra note 65, at 460.
72 See id. at 461.
73 See id.
74 Richard Posner, Review of Law and Public Order in Space by Myres S. McDougal, Harold
Lasswell & Ivan Vlasic, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1370, 1372–73 (1964) (book review).
75 Id. at 1372.
76 Id. at 1372–73. Posner asks:
Is not all of this [talk of custom and burden of proof] rather beside the point?
To whom would the Soviet Union have to prove the “lawfulness” of its conduct—of what practical significance would its “onus” be? Can the Soviet Union, in the space arena, be dismissed as “only one of many interested states”?
Is it enough that the Soviet Union might be restrained by fear of retaliation
by the United States—are we speaking of law or the balance of power?
Id. at 1372.
77 Id. at 1372–73.
78 Id. at 1373.
79 See id. at 1373–74.
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best to undermine all the constituents of law’s distinctiveness.80 To
Hoffman:
Law is distinguished from other political instruments by certain formal features: there is a certain solemnity to its establishment; it has to be elaborated in a certain way. More significantly, the legal order, even in international affairs, has a life
and logic of its own: there are courts and legal experts who
apply standards of interpretation that are often divorced from
underlying political and social factors.81
Oran Young was similarly concerned about law losing its discriminatory power in the hands of those who advocated for policy-oriented
jurisprudence.82 The dispute was not over the existence of a “world
constitutive process of authoritative decision,” but rather how to designate this process “not simply in the interest of preserving certain verbal
formulae but of maintaining sufficient distinctions between social categories.”83 In Young’s view, the utility of maintaining what McDougal
derisively and hyperbolically called an “Austinian” conception of law
was to allow for “explor[ing] the connections between the law of a social system on the one hand and the changing distribution of power or
the evolution of authority relations in the system on the other.”84
McDougal rejected any such division as obscurantism, mainly because
he defined the political process in such a narrow way that in order to
accommodate the fluidity of authoritative process, he had to expand
the scope of legal process.85 In McDougal’s view, Young’s demand for a
distinction between the law of a social process and the dynamic distribution of power and evolution of authority is an example of “much too
common a practice among social scientists, as well as among some unenlightened lawyers, to accept a limited, conventional, and parochial
conception of law . . . and to conclude, hence, that naked power reigns
supreme in ‘international relations’ or ‘the international system.’”86 In
fact, as Robert Wood demonstrates, Young, “like most political scien80 Hoffmann et al., supra note 46, at 118–20.
81 Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Relations, 57 Am. Soc. Int’l. L. Proc. 26, 33 (1963).
82 Young, supra note 43, at 64.
83 Wood, supra note 37, at 429–30.
84 Young, supra note 43, at 64.
85 Wood, supra note 37, at 430.
86 Myres S. McDougal, International Law and Social Science: A Mild Plea in Avoidance, 66
Am. J. Int’l L. 77, 78 (1972) [hereinafter McDougal, International Law and Social Science].
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tists, distinguishes in the first instance between ‘naked power’ and ‘political power,’ particularly in reference to a ‘political community.’”87
Like Lasswell and McDougal, integrationists consider “[i]nterdependence and consciousness of interdependence” to constitute the essence of a political system or a social community and, thus, identify a
political community with the conscious pursuit of social transactions on
the basis of “the authoritative distribution of values.”88 To them, legal
systems, which embody a set of rules and principles, “are both aspects
and outcomes of this authoritative process,” and though they can be
evaluated in light of the fluid process of the authoritative distribution
of values, they cannot be mistaken for the whole process.89 Thus, while
many of the social scientists and lawyers who call on McDougal and
Lasswell to distinguish between different social categories agree about
the breadth of authoritative processes of decision-making, they distinguish between naked power, political power, and legal principles, rules,
and standards.90 What is disputed, then, is in effect the scope of the
authoritative decision-making processes.91 Lasswell and McDougal assimilate politics in its entirety into the legal processes of authoritative
decision-making, while political scientists, in a disciplinary rivalry,
maintain the political nature of authoritative decision-making processes
and limit jurisdiction to where legal principles, rules, and standards are
at work in a specialized institutional setting.92 Expanding the scope of
the legal process of authoritative decision-making in the New Haven
Jurisprudence meant eclipsing politics for the political scientist, just as
it portended the demise of law for the mainstream international law
discipline. Introduced to the configurative jurisprudence of New Haven, both sets of professionals were distraught that they no longer recognized their uniquely held disciplinary identities in a system that cor87 Wood, supra note 37, at 430. Wood draws on this distinction in the works of David
Easton, who, in Wood’s words, defines politics “in terms of the authoritative allocation of
values in society,” in The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political
Science 129–34 (1960); Karl Deutsch who, in Wood’s words, believes that a political community is “a community of social transaction supplemented by both enforcement and
compliance,” in Political Community at the International Level: Problems of
Measurement and Definition 40 (1954); and Leon Lindberg, who, according to Wood,
“defines the essence of a political community as being the existence of a legitimate system
for the resolution of conflict, for the making of authoritative decisions for the group as a
whole,” in The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration 7 (1963).
88 Wood, supra note 37, at 431.
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id.
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roded each and every conceivable distinction between various social
categories.
The international law discipline’s skepticism about the absence of
an adequate distinction between different categories of authoritative
processes of decision-making in the New Haven Jurisprudence mirrors
its frustration with McDougal’s exaggerated and one-sided portrayal of
his opponents’ defense of potential flexibility in the application of
rules, principles, and standards.93 In the interest of replacing law with
power, as the argument goes, McDougal castigates the “rule-oriented”
approach as an illusory hope in “rules hav[ing] a meaning or ‘normative character’ largely independent of the purposes of the people who
make use of them; and [in] these rules admit[ting], apparently without
aid of criteria of interpretation, of practically automatic application in
particular instances.”94 By attributing to his opponents a “model of automation in decision”95 and utter disregard for the complementary nature of both rules and policies, and, further, by challenging their unawareness of what he calls the general normative ambiguity of rules,
McDougal is understood to practically end any substantial dialogue
about the actual interaction of rules and policies and irreversibly declare the rule-oriented approach futile.96 His impatience with any consideration by his opponents of the flexibility of principles and standards, if not the openness of precise rules per se, along with his
unwavering faith in the liberating force of policy applied in a manner
consistent with the order of the masters of power, leads to suspicions
that law in the hands of McDougal is “merely an increment to power.”97
93 See Donald Charles Daniel, Clarification and Appraisal of the Policy-Oriented Framework for International Legal Analysis: Inquiry into the Work of Myres S. McDougal 156 (Apr.
16, 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with Edward
Bennett Williams Law Library, Georgetown University).
94 Myres S. McDougal, A Footnote, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 383, 383 (1963).
95 Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A
Contemporary International Law of the Sea 48 n.124 (1962) [hereinafter McDougal
& Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans] (“One can only wonder where Prof. Fisher
is able to observe in flesh his model of automation in decision, and by what criteria he
recommends that particular choices be made between inevitably complementary policies
of the international law of the sea.”).
96 See Daniel, supra note 93, at 167.
97 Anderson, supra note 45, at 382. Anderson finds ample evidence for his argument in
some of McDougal’s writings on power:
Among the instruments of power, when power is comprehensively conceived,
there might be recognized, finally, not merely diplomacy, propaganda, armaments, and goods, but an international law which is an expression, not of
an arbitrary political fiat, but of the fundamental policies of peoples and in
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Distinguishing between policy-oriented jurisprudence and its application by McDougal and his associates to questions of world public
order, one scholar locates the problem not in the comprehensive authoritative process of decision-making itself, but in the notion that
McDougal conflates the descriptive with the prescriptive.98 Using the
NHS’s own terminology, when “theory about law” is used as “theory of
law, or at least of law-making,” cynicism about rules is expected.99 This
is reminiscent of legal realism’s relationship to rules, precedent, and
stare decisis.100 While it is true that the mere development of a theory
that minimizes or questions the utility of rules does not change existing
expectations about the role of rules, it is also true that propagating contextualism or empirical methods does not necessarily synchronize the
standard, societal understanding of legal reasoning or diminish the
generally expected central role of law in most legal contexts.101 In this
reading, conflating theories about law and theories of law is not essential to the contextualist theory of Lasswell and McDougal, but rather it
is incidental to the way they have implemented their policy-oriented
jurisprudence in addressing practical questions of international law.102
“The very expectation that law is distinct and different from politics, or
that it does or does not operate in international relations, is a matter
for investigation in different settings.”103
Other scholars consider rules, merely for practical reasons, to have
a relatively significant role.104 Rules are “rational and indispensable” in
many decision-making contexts simply because of “the possibility and
desirability of promoting greater uniformity and hence predictability of
decision by limiting the variety of contextual factors that a decisionmaker . . . should be encouraged to take into account.”105 Rules, like
which decision-makers have a continuous creative role in formulating, applying, and re-formulating such policies.
Myres S. McDougal, Dr. Schwartzenberger’s Power Politics, 47 Am. J. Int’l L. 115, 119 (1953)
(book review) [hereinafter McDougal, Dr. Schwartzenberger’s Power Politics], quoted in Anderson, supra note 45, at 382.
98 Tipson, supra note 31, at 241.
99 Id. at 241–42.
100 See, e.g., William Twining & David Miers, How to Do Things with Rules: A
Primer of Interpretation 48–72 (1976) (providing a foundation for rules in general);
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1038–40 (1961).
101 Tipson, supra note 31, at 242.
102 See id.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 242–43.
105 Tom J. Farer, International Law and Political Behavior: Toward a Conceptual Liaison, 25
World Pol. 430, 440–41 (1973), quoted in Tipson, supra note 31, at 242–43; see Ian Brown-
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theories, are therefore essential to reduce the “overwhelming bulk” of
social phenomena to a volume that is manageable in practical decisionmaking.106 This is salient especially when interpreting international legal agreements because the text itself provides a strong basis for identifying and considering all relevant contextual factors. 107
C. Policy-Orientation as Conceptual Grandiloquence 108
The third series of critiques targets the style of presentation in the
New Haven Jurisprudence.109 Complex style and perplexing terminology are trademarks of Lasswell’s work that find their way into the New
Haven Jurisprudence. During his tenure with the Wartime Communications Research Project, the main task of which was to apply content
analysis to American fascist propaganda, Lasswell was presented with an
opportunity to fulfill his dream of psychiatrist-as-king and activist.110
Lasswell’s high hopes for a positive role for social scientists, however,
went awry in large part due to his abstruse expression.111 The governlie, The Public Order of the Oceans, 12 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1053, 1056 (1963) (book review).
Brownlie seems to be concerned about the value and practical usage of The Public Order of
the Oceans, compared to “a text, a set of clear prescriptions,” for decision-makers “who have
to live by the law and custom of the sea.” Id.
106 Farer, supra note 105, at 441–42.
107 See Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our “Interpretation” of It?, 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 358, 369 (1971) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal et al.,
The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order (1967)); Gidon
Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law, 21 World Pol. 108, 110
(1968) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and
World Public Order (1967)).
108 The word is borrowed from Erwin Griswold who, recognizing the importance of
Lasswell and McDougal’s approach to legal education, nevertheless found it to be “impaired by a certain tendency towards grandiloquence.” Erwin Griswold, Intellect and Spirit,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 292, 297 (1968).
109 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, at 360–61; Fred Rodell, Legal Realists, Legal Fundamentalists, Lawyer Schools, and Policy Science—Or How Not to Teach Law, 1 Vand. L. Rev. 5, 6–7
(1947) (suggesting that McDougal’s style is plagued with verbosity and outlandishness).
Fitzmaurice offers a spirited critique of McDougal and his co-authors’ style in The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order, noting,
[T]his book . . . is written in a highly esoteric private language[—]we do not
say jargon, but a kind of juridical code which renders large tracts of it virtually
incomprehensible to the uninitiated (or at least to the unpracticed and unversed), short of a word by word “construe,” such as we did in school with our
Latin unseens.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, 360.
110 Mark Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918–1941, at 246, 247–48 (1994).
111 See id. at 247–48.

2012]

Pragmatism and the NHS’s International Law of Human Dignity

83

ment, being wary of the dangers of emphasizing ideology, wished to
keep the project entirely limited to research on facts and figures.112
Lasswell tried to convince his superiors of the importance of a positive
movement against fascism, proclaiming, “[i]f democracy is to endure,
democracy must make propaganda in favor of itself and against propaganda hostile to itself.”113 His inability to make a convincing point
about this normative view of propaganda and the positive role of social
scientists was partly due to the general discomfort of his superiors with
propaganda, and mostly due to his usage of technical vocabulary and
putatively scientific methods that were incomprehensible to anyone
outside his research group.114
This story resonates with many international lawyers who encounter Lasswell and McDougal’s work. Lasswell alone is said to “move heaven and earth to find the picayune meaningful,” if only for the fact that
“he operates best with high abstractions and adores the game of multivariable ping-pong.”115 When Erwin Griswold noted a tendency toward
“grandiloquence” in the New Haven proposal, he specifically had the
first Lasswell-McDougal collaboration on legal education in mind.116
Despite the intended limited application of the term, many in the field
found the term grandiloquence to be applicable to the complex language and sophisticated conceptual framework used throughout New
Haven’s jurisprudence.117
In terms of accessibility and comprehensibility, the pedagogical
program of policy science at Yale did not fare any better than its volumi-

112 Id. at 247.
113 Id. (quoting Memorandum from Harold D. Lasswell to Henry Morgenthau, Sec’y of
the Treasury (Feb. 17, 1941)). Smith recounts that, disappointed with then-Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s lack of enthusiasm about Lasswell’s proposals for positive
propaganda,
[Lasswell] descended on [Office of Facts and Figures] director [Archibald]
MacLeish and bombarded him with an array of technical material and verbiage.
MacLeish, an internationally recognized poet and cultural critic, certainly realized and respected the power of words and ideas. But he recollected that this
meeting left him unconvinced and ignorant of Lasswell’s main points.
Id.

114 Id. at 248.
115 Leo Rosten, Harold Lasswell: A Memoir, in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell 1, 9 (Arnold A. Rogow ed., 1969).
116 See Griswold, supra note 108, at 297.
117 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, at 360.
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nous scholarly texts.118 It faced agnosticism similar to the popular midtwentieth century concerns about the return of natural law.119 Jerome
Frank warned his classes about a new brand of natural law in policy sciences “far vaguer than many of the older brands.”120 Reportedly, many
students “call[ed] one of the Lasswell-McDougal courses ‘drifting and
dreaming.’”121 Likewise, the Yale Law faculty found Lasswell to be “a
queer guy,” and found his “jargon irritating.”122 “They couldn’t understand him,” and “[n]obody on the faculty had much use for [him], but
he was McDougal’s protégé.”123
Reacting to the application of policy sciences to coercion, Friedmann unwittingly paid tribute to McDougal by comparing his style to
that of Hegel, only to charge both at once with the legitimization of hegemony.124 “Just as [h]undreds of pages of rigorous conceptual dialectics in Hegel’s Philosophy of Law and State . . . disguise that Hegel really
wanted to show that the reactionary Prussian monarchy under which he
held his chair at the University of Berlin was the ultimate embodiment
of the world spirit,” McDougal’s use of conceptual and indirect language was an attempt to embroider a simple and plain allowance for the
use of nuclear armaments or preemptive self-defense against a Commu118 See Stewart Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors: Notes on the Margins of “Professional Training in the Public Interest,” 54 Va. L. Rev. 617, 635 (1968) (analyzing
the shortcomings of the Lasswell-McDougal pedagogical approach). Macaulay emphasizes
the contribution of social sciences to an understanding of “the formal and informal processes of government as they affect people and are affected by them . . . even prior to value
analysis,” which the Lasswell-McDougal approach so forcefully advocates. Id.
119 See id.
120 Kalman, supra note 10, at 183.
121 Id. Fuller agreed that Lasswell and McDougal had developed a new type of natural
law by listing values that aid the decision-maker in determining “what values are to be effectuated—in other words what he wants . . . . The rest is a mere matter of technical implementation with which Professors McDougal and Lasswell have no direct concern and
for which they assume no responsibility.” Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at MidCentury, 6 J. Legal Educ. 457, 479 (1954). For another reading of the policy-oriented approach in line with natural law, see Crisolito Pascual, The Policy Function of the Law: Value
Creation, Clarification and Realization, 29 Phil. L.J. 431, 435–38 (1954) (“[T]he [New Haven] approach may be said to be a vigorous advocacy for a return to the natural law thinking, highlighting the apparent failure of the modern theories of law, . . . especially in the
maintenance of the social interest in the infinite worth and value of human life, personality and dignity.”) For an approving comparison between McDougal’s advocacy of human
dignity and natural law, see Dom David Granfield, Towards A Goal-Oriented Consensus, 19 J.
Legal Educ. 379, 380 (1966) (“Although McDougal’s writings stem apparently from a
dissimilar philosophical position, they do exhibit remarkable conformity with the Catholic
philosophia perennis . . . .”).
122 Kalman, supra note 10, at 184.
123 Id.
124 Friedmann, supra note 59, at 609–10.
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nist state.125 This complexity merely exacerbates the ambiguity and uncertainty in McDougal’s approach toward the significant and determinative role of policy considerations in international law.126 Thus, beyond a
matter of random stylistic taste or preference, simplicity and clarity of
prose were demanded of McDougal in order to deflect suspicions of a
disguised, spurious agenda.127
The critique of abstruseness comes not merely from skeptics, but
also from those generally sympathetic to the complexity and conceptualism of the New Haven Jurisprudence.128 “One can admire the intellectual resources brought to McDougal’s scholarly conceptualism of law as an
instrument of social and humanitarian will, without approving unqualifiedly the abstruse formulation of principles [therein] enunciated.”129
Note that the point of contention here is not McDougal’s methodological conceptualism and its implications, but rather his conceptual framework, so far as it “cloaks the substance” of the ideas, and his “structural
idiom” that detracts from the intelligibility of the conceptual formulation of law.130
Yet others remained skeptical about the practical impact of the
New Haven writings on world public order and questioned if the principal audience of these writings could in any way benefit from the
complex style and thought process of the New Haven teachings in actual decision-making.131 Because McDougal’s recommendations are
recognized as theoretical and in part visionary, their comprehension is
restricted to the initiated and the “scholar who needs to know the
thought behind thought,” and thus remain out of reach for those who
look for guidance with no interest in digesting “a world maze.”132 This
is due in part to the fact that the recommendations of McDougal and
his associates, particularly in areas less subjected to existing regulations,
125 Id.
126 Id. at 610.
127 See id. at 609.
128 See Alwyn V. Freeman, Professor McDougal’s Law and Minimum World Public Order, 58
Am. J. Int’l L. 711, 715 (1964) (book review).
129 Id. (emphasis added).
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Claude Mickelwait, Book Review, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 534, 537 (1962) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
Order (1961)) (“[T]he voluminous treatment may detract from its practicality unless an
authoritative condensation, phrased in the customary terms of the varied contexts, is provided for the decision-makers who usually lack the time to absorb and appreciate fully the
complex bases for action set forth in this volume.”).
132 Cameron Wehringer, Book Review, 31 Brook. L. Rev. 197, 199 (1964) (reviewing
Myres S. McDougal et al., Law and Public Order in Space (1963)).

86

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 35:59

are prone to theoretical verbosity only loosely in touch with reality.133
Even when the reader’s mind finds new horizons in McDougal’s work,
it is doubtful that there is an acceptable balance between the intellectual reward and perseverance required to follow the work’s masterly
blend of astronomy, sociology, anthropology, and political science.134
Another more sophisticated strand of critique of the cumbersome
apparatus of policy-oriented jurisprudence shifts the attention away
from mere comprehensibility to the substantive content of the scientific
claims of policy sciences.135 Under this reading, the problem with
McDougal’s cumbersome language is its machinations to shield the
pseudo-scientific nature of the jargon used in order to give an illusion
of mastery of scientific language.136 McDougal and his associates offer
postulates in the format of a conceptual formula using the language of
symbols without creating equations or any other mathematical medium
to make sense of those symbols.137 Reducing propositions to symbols
without mathematical models, however, is little more than a mockery of
scientific work—it is in effect only creating symbols for the sake of symbols.138 The “turgid style” of the New Haven School writings is a lamentable heritage of social scientists, which paradoxically, “while attempting to create order,” in fact “create[s] a form of chaos.”139

133 The reviewer refers to McDougal and his coauthors’ elaboration on “inclusive enjoyment versus exclusive appropriation,” using the example of the Antarctica Treaty, and
questions the authors’ claim that it was in fact enlightenment that resolved difficulties in
the Antarctica. “In Antarctica, if enlightenment means self-interest, it can be power based.
The Antarctica Treaty did not resolve difficulties, but . . . it ‘froze’ the status of conflicting
claims.” Id.
134 See D.H.N. Johnson, Book Review, 13 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1121, 1122 (1964) (reviewing Myres S. McDougal et al., Law and Public Order in Space (1963)). But see
James Milton Brown, Law and Public Order in Space, 36 Miss. L.J. 116, 119 (1964) (book
review) (“It is disappointing to find legally-trained critics, whose functional lives evolve
around a special vocabulary, complain . . . over the need to devote a little effort to acquire
the precision tools of the Public Order vocabulary.”); and Edward Hambro, Law and Minimum World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 745,
748 (1962) (book review) (“The reading of the book needs a certain amount of hard work,
but once the reader masters the terminology of the book, he is richly rewarded. He will
not always find the solution to all the problems, but he will find a penetrating analysis, a
fresh approach, and original thought.”).
135 See Allison Scafuri, Book Review, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 863, 864–66 (1965) (reviewing
Myres S. McDougal et al., Law and Public Order in Space (1963)).
136 See id. at 863.
137 Id.
138 See id. at 863, 865.
139 Id. at 863 (finding analogy in H.L. Menken’s review of Thorstein Veblen, The
Theory of the Leisure Class (1918)).

2012]

Pragmatism and the NHS’s International Law of Human Dignity

87

Despite the stylistic criticism, however, some scholars recognized
the intellectual capital needed to engage with McDougal’s language
and found it to be rewarding through the heightened awareness it
raised about the world legal order.140 “A reader should be prepared . . .
for an austere pilgrimage, unalleviated by witty asides or enhancing
quotations.”141 Falk attributes the general criticism of McDougal’s obscure jargon and murky sentences to many who privately concede that
they in fact have lacked the time or patience to navigate through the
policy-oriented jurisprudence.142 In Falk’s view, McDougal’s style corresponds to his intellectual ambitions.143 McDougal, borrowing from
Lasswell, aims to present a comprehensive and systemic account of social realities that impact the process and structure of policy choices in
legal decision-making.144 Such a lofty endeavor needs a precise, though
perhaps unconventional, linguistic device. The complexity of McDougal’s writings “stems from an insistence upon nuance and accuracy, not
from an infatuation with German metaphysics, or some inborn quality
of verbal ineptitude.”145 “His sentences are almost always impossible to
improve upon.”146 Stylistic criticisms of McDougal stem from an antiintellectualism that expects accessible language in legal writings for the
benefit of the uninitiated.147 But McDougal’s framework of analysis,
which reflects a complicated image of social reality, is comparable to
Einsteinian physics in its usage of a complex language to open a new
path of inquiry into realities that habitually remain masked from lawyers’ views.148
To take stock, the three categories of critiques of policy-oriented
jurisprudence—policy as legitimization, policy as invasion of power into
law, and policy framework as conceptual grandiloquence—comprise
the body of the critical reactions provoked by the methodological renewal of the New Haven Jurisprudence.149 As is evident, McDougal’s
interlocutors, when they were able to see beyond problems with the
accessibility of New Haven’s approach, focused on either ideological
140 E.g., Falk, supra note 49, at 643.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 658.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 644, 658.
145 Id. at 658.
146 Falk, supra note 49, at 658.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See Anderson, supra note 45, at 382; Fitzmaurice, supra note 107, at 360–61; Friedmann, supra note 59, at 608; Rodell, supra note 109, at 6–7.
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analyses or the ill consequences of New Haven’s conception of power
for the rule of law.150
To be sure, there were sharper critical voices who found fault with
McDougal’s faith in an absolute concept of human dignity and its determining role for legal outcomes.151 Some took issue with the lack of
adequate empirical inquiry in the New Haven Jurisprudence, despite
“ambiguous hints to the contrary,” to validate the postulated values of
human dignity, which remain “rather ab extra scientiam (though perhaps
ab intra McDougal).”152 Others challenged McDougal’s confidence in a
consensus about values and his Suarezian vision of “world community”
with homogeneous values.153 Still others highlighted the threat that
McDougal’s thought posed to the rule of law by prescribing human
dignity as the favored value of the interpreter in the interpretation of
rules or international agreements.154 Further, some accused McDougal
of Hegelian idealism because he considered conflicting interests to be
capable of resolving themselves to the satisfaction of the parties involved and that of the “policy of the world community” through a priori
values.155 And still others believed that McDougal’s invocation of postulated values of human dignity as the foundational criteria of legality
masked the oppressive role of social structures, and thereby forestalled
a more concrete criticism that would place in the foreground factors of
class, gender, and race.156
Like other external critiques, however, these more insightful reactions failed to engage with New Haven’s internal, epistemic structure.
Finding fault with the nature and place of the values representing human dignity in the NHS and identifying that as another form of foundationalism is one thing,157 but delineating how exactly this founda150 See Anderson, supra note 45, at 382; Friedmann, supra note 59, at 608.
151 See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches 100 (1993); Julius Stone, Problems Confronting Sociological Enquiries
Concerning International Law, 89 Recueil des Cours 61, 73 n.1 (1956).
152 Stone, supra note 151, at 73 n.1.
153 See id. at 113 n.1.
154 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 100.
155 E.g., Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l L. 79, 125 (1971).
156 E.g., Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104
Yale L.J. 1991, 2007 (1995) (reviewing McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a
Free Society, supra note 7).
157 These values, which are in fact categories of desired events or preferences, are:
power (participation in making important decisions—those involving severe deprivations);
respect (access to other values on the basis of merit without discrimination on grounds
irrelevant to capacity); enlightenment (access to knowledge, which is the basis of rational
choice); wealth (control over economic goods and services); well-being (enjoyment of
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tionalism affected New Haven’s problem-oriented policy approach, and
what this meant for decision-making in international law, is quite another. Interestingly, such an engagement—one that takes the claims,
premises, and promises of McDougal’s thought seriously enough to
evaluate its function on its own terms—is absent from the scant accounts that find the policy-oriented and problem-solving characters of
the New Haven Jurisprudence consistent with the insights of pragmatism. The result is that human dignity and pragmatism, the two identifying faces of the Lasswell-McDougal project, which correlate with its
normative and scientific commitments, remain epistemologically disconnected. Even after taking into account all the strands of criticism, it
remains unclear why the pragmatist promises of contextualism and
problem-solving methodology were unfulfilled. Nor do we learn whether or how the relationship between human dignity and pragmatism in
the New Haven Jurisprudence may be related to, or explain, the logical
correspondence between the policy-oriented approach and American
foreign policy dictates.
II. Pragmatism and International Law in the
New Haven Jurisprudence
Counting generously, there are only a handful of reflections on
pragmatism and international legal theory. When considering a pragmatist representative in international law, however, these sparse accounts all turn their gaze toward the NHS’s policy-oriented approach.
One would expect to easily trace the intellectual footprint of pragmatism in Lasswell’s work through his years in Chicago, where Dewey’s
thought traveled into various social scientific disciplines.158 But Lasswell
himself, the mind behind policy science, did not acknowledge an explicit intellectual debt to philosophical pragmatism, founded by
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, except for a
few cursory observations in his later writings.159 The Lasswell-McDougal
physical and psychic health); skill (proficiency in the exercise of latent talent); affection
(enjoyment of sympathetic human relationships); and rectitude (sharing a sense of community responsibility). See Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 Recueil des Cours 133, 168 (1953) [hereinafter McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy].
158 See Harold D. Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, at xiii–xiv (1971) [hereinafter Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences].
159 In 1971, Lasswell wrote: “The policy sciences are a contemporary adaptation of the
general approach to public policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his colleagues in the development of American pragmatism.” Id. at xiv. Earlier on in his first exposition on policy sciences, Lasswell had a less direct reference to his affinity for pragma-
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policy-oriented international law does not include any direct or indirect
mention of pragmatism either. This is quite consistent with the history
of pragmatism itself, which went out of philosophical fashion right
around the birth of the NHS and reappeared as neopragmatism well
after the maturity of McDougal’s jurisprudence.160
In fact, in McDougal’s time, Philip Allott appears to have been the
only commentator who directly took note of pragmatism, though only
in the context of denying McDougal a place either in the American
pragmatist tradition or in realism.161 There was, Allott said, “too much
of a priori in McDougal . . . a certain Hegelian element . . . in the basic
concept of McDougal’s method, that of states with competing interests
which must be resolved into something which satisfies both sides and
also satisfies the policy of the world community (world-spirit).”162 Allott’s brief but keen observation gets to the heart of the problem of a
priori concepts, such as human dignity and its correlatives such as
community policy, inherent in the NHS.163 It does not, however, go far
enough to explain what a pragmatist commitment to the normative
values of human dignity would look like or to articulate the consequences of McDougal’s accommodation of a priori values for his problem-solving and contextualist ambitions. Allott seems to be after the
philosophical roots of McDougal’s normative commitments164 and his
tism. See The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method 12 (Daniel
Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1951) [hereinafter The Policy Sciences]. On another
occasion, Lasswell makes a curious comparison between pragmatism and mysticism:
“Pragmatists assert that the quest for truth is a ‘logic of inquiry.’ It is, therefore, an experience in self-discipline in the course of which the knowledge and perhaps the order of
preference of the inquirer is open to change.” Harold D. Lasswell, The Future of Political Science 155 (1963).
160 For a fine history of philosophy of pragmatism, see Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism (Robert Hollinger & David Depew eds., 1995). But see Robert Talisse,
Pragmatism and the Cold War, in The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy 254 (Cheryl
Misak ed., 2008) (arguing against the eclipse of pragmatism through the Cold War).

161 Allott, supra note 155, at 125.
162 Id.
163 See id.
164 Allott believes that no tradition of political and moral philosophy is relevant except
for utilitarianism:
There is abundant evidence . . . that McDougal accepts the possibility of a
“calculus of values”, in the style of Bentham; . . . It seems clear that he feels
able to weigh one interest against another, one value against another, one
value-statement against another. The words “weigh” and “outweigh” are used
on more than one occasion in such a context. It is highly speculative to suggest what the equivalents of “pleasure” and “pain” would be in McDougal’s
system; possibly “humanity” and “inhumanity”.
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mention of pragmatism is as cursory as a simple rejection of its connection with the NHS.165
Only after its renascence and reemergence on the legal theory
scene166 did pragmatism receive some attention—though scant—in
international law.167 In Patterns of American Jurisprudence, Neil Duxbury
intriguingly suggests that the NHS, in spite of all that Lasswell and
McDougal might have intended to the contrary, “represents a suppression rather than a continuation of the realist faith in pragmatism.”168
Duxbury admits that this claim is “strange” because the purpose of policy-oriented jurisprudence seems to be the strengthening of the problem-solving and policy-making skills of the would-be-lawyer.169 The path
of the policy-oriented approach is linked to the history of Dewey’s
thought after World War II.170 Lasswell and McDougal adopted Dewey’s
conception of democracy as a set of basic human ideals, the optimum
realization of which calls for proper institutions throughout society.171
Furthermore, policy science, similar to Dewey’s attempt to reconstruct
philosophy,172 expounded a set of intellectual tasks to reconstruct legal
education and the legal profession.173
An emphasis on democracy and the cultivation of a set of intellectual skills however, Duxbury writes, does not make policy science a pragmatic theory.174 “For policy science is too preoccupied with the development of a methodology and too little concerned with the matter of
how that methodology may prove in some way to be useful.”175 Policy
Id.

165 See id.
166 See, e.g., Michal Alberstein, Pragmatism and Law: From Philosophy to Dispute Resolution (2002); Michael Brint & William Weaver, Pragmatism in Law and
Society (1991); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Sociolegal Theory: Pragmatism and
A Social Theory of Law (1997); Renascent Pragmatism: Studies in Law and Social
Science (Alfonso Morales ed., 2003); The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
167 See Duxbury, supra note 8, at 191.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 200.
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Allan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism
(1995); Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (1991).
172 See generally John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1948).
173 See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the role of each of the five intellectual tasks
in the New Haven Jurisprudence: goal clarification, trend thinking, scientific thinking,
developmental thinking, and alternative thinking). For further comparison of LasswellMcDougal and Dewey, see Frederick Samson Tipson, Note, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 535, 539–40 (1974).
174 Duxbury, supra note 8, at 201.
175 Id.
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science jurisprudence, thus, is “[a]t best groundwork; interpreted less
charitably, it is the use of theory to encourage procrastination over matters practical.”176
Duxbury’s reading seems to promise the right destination. Nevertheless, it neither takes the right direction, nor goes far enough on the
road to that destination. His concern, in the last analysis, is similar to the
earlier complaints regarding McDougal’s conceptual grandiloquence:177
“The idea that [lawyers] might achieve as much by becoming versed in
the language and methods of policy science demanded too great a leap
of faith. It demanded also, certainly of academic lawyers, too radical a
reorientation of perspective.”178 This recognition certainly carries a
great deal of explanatory power and historical significance for understanding the career of the New Haven Jurisprudence and its reception
by the international legal discipline.179 The overemphasis on the role of
experts—policy scientists of democracy and international lawyers of
human dignity—corresponds to the fate of pragmatism in the United
States after Dewey and throughout most of the Cold War. As far as the
contribution of philosophical pragmatism is concerned, however, Duxbury’s account reduces it to mere practicability. Equating pragmatism
with practicability is little more than a vernacular reading of pragmatism
and sets a very low threshold for the understanding of both pragmatism
and New Haven’s policy-oriented international law.
In a constructivist proposal, Harry Gould and Nicholas Onuf suggest that pragmatism can provide constructivism with everything it
needs epistemically to present an alternative view of rules as social constructs against ontological realism.180 This pragmatist approach to the
conditions of rule, however, is found neither in the early pragmatism of
Peirce, James, and Dewey, nor in Legal Realism.181 Dewey delved into
political theory but did not consider the conditions of rule in any of his
writings. Likewise, Legal Realists paid great attention to methods of adjudication and the study of law, but were uninterested in broader politi-

176 Id. at 202.
177 See supra text accompanying note 108.
178 Duxbury, supra note 8, at 202.
179 See Hengameh Saberi, From Policy Science of Democracy to International Law of
Human Dignity: A Translation Revisited (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
180 Harry Gould & Nicholas Onuf, Pragmatism, Legal Realism and Constructivism, in
Pragmatism in International Relations 26, 31–32 (Harry Bauer & Elisabetta Brighi
eds., 2009).
181 See id. at 38.
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cal theory.182 To find a pragmatist view of the conditions of rule, Gould
and Onuf suggest that one should turn to the New Haven Jurisprudence, which they introduce as pragmatism’s representative in international law.183
Starting with Legal Realism’s position about “the instrumentality of
the law and its reconceptualization as a locus of judgment,” Lasswell and
McDougal proceeded a step further, delineating the process of “authoritative decision” and its relation to “effective control,”184 and asking oftneglected questions such as: how to identify rules; who may prescribe
rules (for whom and by what procedures); who may invoke rules; and
how to apply and appraise the effectiveness of rules.185 These are not
merely questions about rules but also about rule—that is, rule as process.186 That said, New Haven’s pragmatist view of rule as process poses a
conceptually binary opposition between two different world public orders—minimum and optimum187—which may not be entirely consistent
with pragmatism’s rejection of absolute and binary distinctions.188 Recognizing the NHS’s pragmatist potentials, Gould and Onuf still believe
that its “daunting conceptual vocabulary and latent rule-skepticism” obscure conditions of rule.189 In their view, the NHS’s emphasis on “the
degree of centralization, or . . . respect for human dignity” in differentiating between minimum and optimum world public orders neglects
more delicate and important differences in forms of rule.190
Gould and Onuf’s reference to the centrality of human dignity captures a significant issue at the heart of the NHS which has negative bearings for its claim to pragmatism. Their concern is to identify variations
in rule depending on context and social process in which rules and rule
perform different functions.191 Their quibble is with the liberal assumption about order as spontaneous, natural, and benign (or not always benign but nevertheless easily manageable and subject to quick adjust182 Id.
183 See id.
184 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 173.
185 Id. at 209–12.
186 Gould & Onuf, supra note 180, at 38–39.
187 For more on these two different world public orders, see generally Myres S.
McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 Yale L.J. 771 (1958) [hereinafter McDougal & Feliciano,
International Coercion and World Public Order] (analyzing the legal framework of international coercion within these two contrasting attitudes).
188 Gould & Onuf, supra note 180, at 40.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See id. at 41–43.
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ments).192 They also take issue with the NHS’s discount of rule and rules
in a world of minimum public order where human dignity is not sufficiently respected, but, as they suggest, where some “functionally limited
hierarchical arrangements” do exist.193 Gould and Onuf do not, however, address the internal structure of policy-oriented jurisprudence and
the consequences of the centrality of human dignity for its pragmatist
and problem-solving promises. Further, beyond quick references to
pragmatism’s incompatibility with binary distinctions, they say little
about the precise implementation of the NHS’s pragmatist promises of
contextualism in relation to the central role of human dignity.
The last and most recent account of international law and pragmatism belongs to an enthusiast for the potential of philosophical pragmatism to bring practice and action back to the center of international legal argument.194 Siegfried Schieder, who in an earlier work presented a
discursive reading of pragmatism in line with neopragmatism,195 posits
two reasons for the lack of attention in literature to the influence of
pragmatism on the international legal system.196 The first reason is that
“perceptive boundaries between pragmatism and international law may
generally impede philosophy from engaging with a practical science.”197
Alternatively, the second reason posits that since pragmatism is understood to relate to the entirety of legal decisions, and since there is limited adjudication in international relations, there has not been adequate
interest in pragmatism’s contribution to international law.198 Why
Schieder considers international law to be merely a “practical science” is
quite curious. Pragmatism’s connection to legal theory through the
medium of adjudication and the low priority of adjudication in international politics, however, is not too farfetched as a possible reason for the
dearth of attention to pragmatism in international law.
In Schieder’s view, the policy-oriented approach of the NHS is
closely related to “the specific American products of instrumentalism
192 See id. at 43.
193 Id.
194 Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism and International Law, in Pragmatism and International Relations, supra note 180, at 127–28 [hereinafter Schieder, Pragmatism and International Law].
195 See Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism as a Path Towards a Discursive and Open Theory of
International Law, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 663, 689 (2000) (taking a neopragmatist turn to present pragmatism merely as a theory of discourse for which justification of norms does not
have much worth beyond the discourse itself).
196 Schieder, Pragmatism and International Law, supra note 194, at 127.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 128.
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and philosophical pragmatism.”199 Adopting a secondary literature description,200 he lists five features of legal pragmatism—antifoundationalism, contextualism, instrumentalism, consequentialism, and perspectivism—in order to argue, in a schematic fashion, that the New Haven Jurisprudence does in fact live up to these pragmatist demands.201
Antifoundationalism in international law, under this account,
amounts to a rejection of positivism and natural law, both of which have
traditionally supported deduction of legal decisions from a basic norm
or a system of norms.202 Against the traditional view of sources of international law, pragmatism stresses a relational and discursive path by
virtue of which norms and legal cases come under the law of contingency and historicity.203 This view, Schieder says, is reflected in none
other than McDougal himself, who questions a metaphysical view of
rules as autonomous absolutes living in a vacuum.204
Schieder’s understanding of (anti)foundationalism is too thin to
take him beyond a superficial portrayal of McDougal’s view of legal
normativity. Consider foundationalism in epistemology to refer to (1) a
set of theories of epistemic justification that rely on a distinction between basic and inferred beliefs, (2) an a priori conception of epistemology on which all claims to knowledge depend, or alternatively (3)
the idea that our standards of weaker or stronger evidence, and of
more or less justified beliefs, must be grounded in some relation to justification and truth.205 Today, foundationalism (as well as its genetically
related terms of transcendentalism, essentialism, metaphysical, etc.) is
no stranger in post-realist American jurisprudence.206 When there is a
lucid account of the relationship between epistemic foundationalism
and legal theory, however, only foundationalism understood in the
third aforementioned category is accounted for with an analogue in
199 Id. at 127. Schieder mistakenly notes that Lasswell and McDougal studied in Chicago in the 1920s under John Dewey and George H. Mead, and claims that was the channel through which pragmatist thinking entered into McDougal’s approach to international
law. It was in fact Lasswell alone who studied in Chicago, and whether he studied under
Dewey directly would need historical proof—one that Schieder fails to provide. Id. at 140
n.3.
200 See id. at 128 (citing Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 Geo. L.J. 2071 (1996)).
201 Id.
202 See id. at 127–28.
203 See id. at 128–29.
204 Id. at 129.
205 Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does “The Path of the Law” Lead Us?, 50 Am.
J. Juris. 71, 104 (2005).
206 Id.
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legal theory: “[T]he idea that legal rules, to be (in a non-epistemic
sense) justified, must be grounded in some relation to (presumably,
moral) values.”207
Understood as Schieder intends, McDougal’s antifoundationalism
stands beyond any doubt and a reference to it is almost redundant.208
This happy ending, however, ignores more than half of the story of
normativity in policy-oriented jurisprudence. Schieder repeats, almost
verbatim, McDougal’s claim to empirical verification of values of human dignity in the NHS as well as his dismissal of philosophical justification.209 He does not pause to find evidence for the NHS’s claim to
empiricism or to ask whether the lack of justification for the normative
commitments of human dignity may bear any consequences for New
Haven’s contextualism and problem-solving promises.210
Likewise, so far as contextualism is concerned, Schieder’s account
is content with a worn-out juxtaposition between the American and European traditions of international law, in which the former is mindful
of social and political circumstances and the latter is convinced of the
objectivity and political neutrality of the rule of law.211 Schieder’s snapshot of New Haven’s pragmatism, however, does not address what context means in a policy-oriented approach, nor does it address how
McDougal and his associates employ contextual variables in practice to
answer legal questions.
The remaining three pragmatist features he attributed to the NHS
are treated with no more diligence in Schieder’s hands.212 An appropriate response to Schieder’s list and his reading of New Haven’s pragmatism is a topic for another occasion. Here it is sufficient to state that
instrumentalism and consequentialism—both philosophical concepts—are, in Schieder’s view, reduced to McDougal’s successful recon-

207 See id. This is only partly true, according to Geoffrey Samuel, whose work on legal
epistemology takes knowledge of “facts,” rather than legal rules, as its central concern. See
Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law 173–80 (2003). Justification and
the status of beliefs (definition 1 above) play a role when lawyers construct and reconstruct
facts in legal cases. See id. at 173. Moreover, the epistemic (non-inferential) status of both
facts and concepts at the heart of some putatively naturalist approaches to jurisprudence is
the litmus test of the veracity of their claim to scientific naturalism. The point here simply
is that the epistemic distinction between basic and inferred beliefs bears important implications for legal theory. See id.
208 See Schieder, Pragmatism and International Law, supra note 194, at 129–30.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See id. at 130–31.
212 See id. at 131–34.
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ciliation of law and power;213 perspectivism, as against positivism, is reduced to the legal system’s openness to newly emerging norms.214
III. Contextualism Contextualized: A Re-Assessment of
Contextual-Orientation of Policy Science
Against Pragmatic Contextualism
As much as contextualism resonates with pragmatism in general, it
is in fact more distinctively particular to neo-pragmatism’s idea of
thinking as situated and context-bound.215 This is the belief that all
thought is rooted in habits and patterns that human beings develop
either individually or, more importantly, as a collective. The development of such patterns and habits is aided by the capacity for language
and their transmission by culture, the two factors capitalized by the renaissant pragmatism of the post-linguistic turn.216
Surely it was pragmatism’s understanding of knowing as situated in
conventions, habits, and practice, as opposed to possessing an a priori
status, that earned it a badge of victory over foundationalism. Not only
did pragmatism’s founding fathers debunk the assumption of a beginning point-zero for human knowledge,217 but they also made clear that
all our inquiries begin with and build upon opinions and beliefs that
“we” have in stock.218 Given the emphasis on the collective notion of
213 See id. at 131–32.
214 See Schieder, Pragmatism and International Law, supra note 194, at 132–34.
215 See id. at 131.
216 For an interesting attempt to project “contextualism” onto classical pragmatism and
provide an account of Holmes as the embodiment of the jurisprudential tenets of American pragmatism, see generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 787 (1989).
217 These grounds are rational indibutable intuitions for the rationalist, and uninterpreted, real data accessible to the mind by senses for the empiricist.
218 Peirce emphasized the impossibility of universal doubt in the following way:
[T]here is but one state of mind from which you can “set out,” namely, the
very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do “set
out”—a state in which you are laden with [an] immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would; and who
knows whether, if you could, you would not have made all knowledge impossible to yourself?
Charles Sanders Peirce, What Pragmatism Is, in 5 Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce 272, 278 (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds., 1934). James was equally clear as to the
importance of opinions each individual has in stock when set out on the path of inquiry,
and his resistance to give up on old beliefs when faced with the “inward trouble” of making
any modifications to those opinions. William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some
Old Ways of Thinking 59–60 (1907). Through this struggle, eventually, the individual
“saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conserva-
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inquiry and the social origins of beliefs and habits from which it proceeds, pragmatism’s break from foundationalism parts ways with the
methodological individualism of empiricism as well.219 Still, contextualism is more often associated with neo-pragmatism because with the neoWittgensteinian centrality of language in all “truth” making endeavors
already standing firm on the philosophical scene, contextualism needed
only to take the ball and run with it to push contingency and historical
irony all the way down.220 Nevertheless, unless it is clear what we mean
by contextualism, a proprietary quibble over the roots of contextualism
in classical pragmatism or in its postmodern reincarnation is futile.221
The historical and practice-bound character of human thought
and life, if that is meant by contextualism, is not unique to pragmatism,
old or new. Philosophers as widely apart as Otto Neurath,222 Martin
Heidegger,223 and Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his later work,224 have all
tives. . . . The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order
standing.” Id. at 60. Dewey only expanded on this idea by introducing creative intelligence
as what supports inquiry when habit and practice become problematic. Inquiry does not
aim to proceed from some pure, basic ground of truth, but always builds upon our existing
knowledge in order to solve problems at hand. “We cannot lay hold of the new, we cannot
even keep it before our minds, much less understand it, save by the use of ideas and
knowledge we already possess.” John Dewey, Experience and Nature, at viii–ix (2d ed.
1929).
219 See Dewey, supra note 218, at 208–11; see also Peirce, supra note 218, at 281.
220 Rorty’s account of our present situation is illustrative of this point:
Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human
mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out
there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world
can be true or false. The world on its own—unaided by the describing activities of human beings—cannot.
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 5 (1989). From the centrality of
language in providing the sole medium to describe the world, and the contingency of all
languages, he then moves to conclude that our “intellectual and moral progress [is] a history of increasingly useful metaphors rather than of increasing understanding of how
things really are.” Id. at 9.
221 For a criticism of the employment of “context” and “contextualism” by non-traditional
approaches to world politics, without an examination of their implications, and an analysis of
context and its influence on methodology and normative theory by historicist and culturalist
versions of contextualism, see Stephanie Lawson, Culture and Context in World Politics 36–57 (2007).
222 Referring to Neurath’s famous metaphoric boat on whose strongest planks inquirers have to hold a stable foot to continue the path of inquiry and reconstruct and change
as they sail. See Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences, in Logical Positivism 199, 201 (A.J. Ayer
ed., 1959).
223 Heidegger was under no illusion that beliefs are free from presupposed prejudices
that are mostly collective, historical, often unquestioned, and pre-reflective. See Martin
Heidegger, Being and Time 190–203 ( J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans., 1962).
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accounted for the constituting role of praxis in human thought. Hegel,
Marx, the historical school of jurisprudence, and Burkean version of
conservative socio-political theory had already sung their “songs of experience”225 and each pondered on the practice-bound character of
human inquiry before the emergence of pragmatism qua a distinctive
philosophical tradition.226 It is true that, contrary to the conservative,
Burkean treatment of history, pragmatism teaches to begin with old
beliefs and builds upon them only so long as such beliefs and habits do
not hinder the best usage of the tools of creative intelligence.227 But
any philosophy that has broken away from foundationalism agrees on
the situated state of knowing. What, then, pairs the “contextual” with
“pragmatic” so ubiquitously? Beyond the vernacular, which tends to automatically equate one with the other, it is perhaps the fact that pragmatism ranks atop other antifoundational traditions in teasing out how
exactly context-dependence of human inquiry epistemically defeats
foundationalism.228 It does so by providing a context-dependent
ground for our investigative affairs which, taken seriously, is liberated
from both the illusion of foundational certainty and the chaos of radical indeterminacy. Regardless of whether pragmatism and epistemic
contextualism as two existential paradigms of knowledge are merely
isomorphic, their similar approaches to the role of practice and context
standing against both foundationalism and skepticism validate their
epistemological union.229 What remains is to explore the function of
224 Ludwig Wittgenstein often emphasized the habitual and social basis of all reasoning
in his later work. See, e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty ¶¶ 166, 189, 204
(G.E.M. Anscombe & D. Paul trans., 1969).
225 See generally Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European
Variations on a Universal Theme 170–216 (2005) (discussing the aforementioned philosophers’ theories on the nature of human experience).
226 See id. at 211–15.
227 See id. at 177–83.
228 See id. at 302–04, 306–07.
229 In contrast to a general tendency to regard pragmatism and contextualism as one
and the same, some have argued for a clear distinction between epistemic contextualism
and epistemic pragmatism. See, e.g., Joseph W. Long, Who Is a Pragmatist: Distinguishing
Epistemic Pragmatism and Contextualism, 16 J. Speculative Phil. 39 (2003). Long applies a
three-fold litmus test to differentiate pragmatism from epistemic contextualism, only the
first of which is notable here. According to the first criterion, the difference between
pragmatism and contextualism lies in responding to the regress problem of justification.
The problem is as follows: every belief C must be inferentially justified by a belief E, which
in turn needs to be justified by another belief F, which needs to be justified by yet another
belief G, ad infinitum. Contrary to foundationalism, which would have the regress end with
some empirically basic or non-inferentially justified beliefs in no need of further justification, the pragmatist holds that our beliefs are immediately justified or unjustified based on
the practical difference their veracity would make. Id. at 41. Contextualists, on the other
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context in the New Haven Jurisprudence with respect to its pragmatic
war against foundationalism.
If jurisprudential approaches of the past failed the test of temporal
relevance because of their scant regard for context and a false claim to
context-transcendence through legal semantics, the configurative jurisprudence of Yale is wary of a direct relationship between its relevance
and context sensitivity.230 The scholar of policy-orientation leaves the
high field of semantics for a more cumbersome and rewarding labor of
self-observation through proper techniques and elements that are sufficiently sensitive to the conditionality of time and space. She has the
modesty of determining her own standpoint in search of objectivity, the
vigilance of protecting her profession’s collective identity against the
distortive influence of power, and the diligence of returning to the field
of semantics only once she is armed with a fair understanding of pragmatics.
While this summary is a fair description of what amounts to contextual-orientation in policy science, further elaboration is in order. The
first part of the argument below details the various functions of context
in the Lasswell-McDougal oeuvre. As will be shown, context-sensitivity, in
the final analysis, is to serve two purposes: a procedure to ensure rationality and a conceptual tool against foundationalism. With this demonstrated, I will reexamine the real function of the conceptual tool of context in policy science against the backdrop of epistemic contextualism.
A. Context, Rationality, Reflexivity, and Pragmatics
Although contextualism is central to the policy-oriented approach,
it is difficult to find an articulate account of how precisely context safeguards inquiry from leaning on any variation of foundationalism. On
its face, the demand of such an account may seem superfluous because
hand, such as Wittgenstein in his later years, think that it is absurd to ask for any justification of our basic beliefs, because—similar to the rules of a game—such basic beliefs are
beyond justification. Id. at 43. So while the pragmatic theory of knowledge argues that our
basic beliefs are justified, contextualism holds that they are not. Id. at 45. In other words,
contextualism is skeptical in an epistemic sense, but anti-skeptical in a pragmatic sense;
whereas pragmatism is epistemically anti-skeptical. This distinction, though intriguing, is
overshadowed by the simultaneously constraining and liberating role of context shared by
epistemic pragmatism and contextualism. Contextualism, whether of epistemic or pragmatic genuses, liberates justification from foundationalism and at the same time constrains
radical indeterminacy. That is a sufficient ground for the argument developed here to
disregard this distinction.
230 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
17.
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the contribution of particularities of context in transcending the limitations of semantic foundationalism is self-evident. The NHS finds semantic foundationalism to be the foremost reason for the failed idealism of both its contemporaneous and past approaches to international
law and boasts context-sensitivity as the remedy for that failure for any
jurisprudence that hopes to be relevant.231 Yet the obvious importance
of considering the socio-political, historical, or economic particularities
of each case in legal decision-making does not per se address how precisely such particularities respond to the insufficiency of the semantic.
In a self-professedly value-oriented jurisprudence such as New Haven’s,
normative values also make up part of the body of the context and so
add yet another layer to the question around the role of context in
overcoming gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in semantics.
Three understandings of contextual-orientation in policy science
can be gleaned from the works of Lasswell and McDougal. The first two
are specific to Lasswell’s policy sciences, and the third one is contextualism as applied to the jurisprudence of international law.
1. Contextual-Orientation and Rational Observation
According to Lasswell, the path of inquiry for the policy analyst is
not a journey with a specific end in view, but rather a means to enhance
the potential for enlightened action.232 Rational inquiry leading to enlightenment reads the meaning of details as part of a whole, the conception of which is in turn constructed, revised, and disciplined
through concrete evidence in a dynamic manner.233 The whole in each
situation under investigation is made up of the socio-historical context
of that situation in addition to value judgments specific to the particular analyst. To ensure rationality, the complex web of social interactions
based on shared meanings and values “recognized and sustained in the
continuing interplay among participants in the social process” must be
considered both as an objective universe to face and as a context to
penetrate by the analyst.234 The analyst undertakes a psychoanalytical
examination of herself and the unfamiliar territory of the social process
and considers the wider context than that which is apparent.235 Yet the
familiar is under constant reexamination as well: “The whole aim of the
231 Id. at xxii.
232 See Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality 217 (1976).
233 See id. at 218.
234 Harold D. Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure, 1 Inquiry 87, 96 (1958) [hereinafter Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment].
235 See Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics 252–53 (1977).
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scientific student of society is to make the obvious inescapable”236 as
“[t]he world about us is much richer in meanings than we consciously
see.”237
Thus, for Lasswell, the conception of the “self-in-context” necessarily links the analyst’s “insight” into one’s self with her knowledge of
other people and a wider social context,238 as it is through an understanding of individual characteristics that are “ordinarily excluded from
the focus of full waking attention by smooth working mechanisms of
‘resistance’ and ‘repression’” that the inhibiting shadow of anxieties is
dispelled and the light of rationality appears.239 As much as psychoanalytic observation of the self and “insight” into individual characteristics
is important to remove blinders and render an understanding of social
context possible in order to make the individual aware of her total institutional context and provide for contextual “insight” into social reality
at different levels, traditional psychoanalytic technique must be
adapted to “reality critique.”240 Rational observation is thus ensured by
the analyst’s deep “insight” into the particular context of individual
specificities which provide the lens through which the institutional context is examined.241
Rational inquiry is also contextual in the sense that it is necessarily
directional, that is, of a temporal, developmental dimension. Contextual-orientation is to discern a totality which is not fixed in time, but
involves both a stable configuration in a particular moment and a
process of changing patterns in the form of historical development.242
The “principle of temporality” requires that the policy analyst, as an
actor within a changing context, adopt a “developmental construct”
and draw an image of anticipated future developments based on past
trends.243 Such a “developmental construct” is not bound to any laws of
historical development, contrary to Marx to whom Lasswell acknowledges a debt for this concept,244 but rather it is tentative and subject to
236 Id. at 250.
237 Id. at 36.
238 Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 155–57.
239 See Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment, supra note 234, at 96–97.
240 Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 158.
241 See id.
242 Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity 4–5 (1965)
[hereinafter Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity].
243 Harold D. Lasswell & Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework
for Political Inquiry, at xiv (1950) [hereinafter Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society].
244 Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 67–68.
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revision. Future events are “partly probable and partly chance” and no
amount of knowledge of past trends and present evidence can totally
eliminate uncertainty.245
Context-sensitivity not only enables the individual observer to see
through her own individual characteristics and background that have
had a pivotal formative influence on her observation, but also empowers the analyst’s professional identity to stand free from the internal
peculiarities of the observer or the external pressure of power. It thereby becomes emancipatory by embedding itself in a professional outlook
conscious of its limits and capabilities.
2. Context-Sensitivity and Professional Reflexivity
The enlightened observer is inescapably, but only implicitly, conscious of her past, present, and future assumptions and the influence of
her natural and cultural environment. To uplift that consciousness to
the level of “undogmatic access to inclusive versions of reality,” there
ought to be professional “policy training operations” that employ appropriate procedures to make a full image of the total context available
to the analyst.246 One example of such a procedure, according to Lasswell, is to hold continuing seminars composed of highly committed
members who willingly engage in a collective psychoanalytic technique
of free association in which “uttering of uncensored suggestions” is encouraged.247 He suggests the appointment of a “devil’s advocate” in an
adversarial model of seminars to challenge dominant predispositions
and help unmask unrecognized demands, expectations, and identifications.248 Pursued seriously, a global network of such seminars to this
end could be established.249
The reflexive labor of the analyst toward reducing constraints upon freedom and rationality of inquiry thus moves beyond “insight” into
oneself, simultaneously demanding and reinforcing an institutional
identity. The identity of rational policy science as such is defined by the
analyst whose “insight” allows her to observe changes of social regularities alongside the changes of “current meaning,” which in turn lead to
a transformation in the practical “context” of action.250 For rational
245 Id. at 11.
246 Id. at 155–56.
247 Id. at 150.
248 Id. at 152–53.
249 See id. at 154.
250 Harold D. Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research, in World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements
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policy science to be effective, the analyst must possess a creative orientation that allows her to at once detach from, and immerse into, the
total context of social process with the mental flexibility to comprehend
the process as one that both influences and is influenced by the actors.251 The principal goal of the enlightened policy analyst in understanding the social process is “truth”; a goal that cannot be simply presumed but must be adopted as a demanding commitment.252 This
commitment is under constant threat by the distortive pressure of
power and can be sustained only through individual efforts of the analyst as well as a cultivated professional identity for rational policy science that supports a network of rational inquirers.253
It is in the face of such circumstantial pressures and internal blind
spots of personal and professional identity that Lasswell devises clear
procedures to maintain contextual-orientation as a distinctive character
of rational policy inquiry.254 Contextual-orientation is thus both an individual and a collective undertaking to enhance the rationality of policy analysis.
3. Inadequacy of Semantics and Pragmatics of Context
A comprehensive orientation in policy science toward context
arms the analyst—whose principal goal of seeking truth sets her apart
from the typical policy actor—with the intellectual means for undogmatic, rational policy analysis, free from the peculiarities of the personal identity and from the symbols or myths attached to professional
identity. Translated to legal labor, the enlightening role of context is
perhaps even more crucial, as the legal agent may act not just as the
scholar to recommend sound decisions, but also as the actor entrusted
with actual decision-making power. Contextual-orientation here ensures the rationality of such decisions in the sense of a closer approximation of community-approved value goals.
Legal semantics, devoid of determinate meaning, riddled with
complementarity of propositions and conducive to normative-ambiguous prescriptions, falls short of the demands of a jurisprudence that is

33–34 (Harold D. Lasswell & Daniel Learner eds., 1965) [hereinafter Lasswell, The World
Revolution of Our Time].
251 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 155–56; Lasswell,
World Politics and Personal Insecurity, supra note 242, at 4–6.
252 Harold D. Lasswell, Some Perplexities of Policy Theory, 14 Soc. Res. 176, 181 (1974).
253 Id. at 177.
254 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 63–64.
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to remain relevant at any time.255 A policy-oriented jurisprudence of
international law “[a]bjur[es] the metaphysical derivations and justifications” of normative prescriptions so characteristic of jurisprudential
work and instead relies on an empirical study of the comprehensive
context of the social process within which the prescription is to be
made.256 Any syntactical derivation from past decisions and semantics of
rules must be weighed against alternative derivations in terms of their
practical consequences for the value goals most extensively shared by
decision-makers and their constituencies.257 Exclusive focus on legal
semologics or content (including semantics and syntactics) without a
conscious appreciation of total context of their cause and effects (pragmatics) bears the blame for much of the normative ambiguity and irrelevance of international law jurisprudence.258
Cognizant of the comprehensive web of essential variables affecting
decisions (causes) and rational appraisal of the aggregate value consequences of competing alternatives (effects), a policy-oriented international law locates authoritative decisions within the social process of the
interaction of a larger global community and smaller communities. Because of interdependency or “interdetermination and interdependence259 of peoples across state lines” as they seek to maximize values by
utilizing institutions and affect resources, says McDougal, one can well
speak (as he does interchangeably) of “world community process” or
“world social process.”260 The world social process is defined by the pro255 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 145–46.
256 See id. at 186.
257 See id. at 146.
258 Lasswell and McDougal, following the “behavioristic” analysis of semiotician
Charles W. Morris in his discussion Foundations of the Theory of Signs, in 1 International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science 77 (Otto Neurath et al. eds., 1938), present a distinction between different statements of law. In brief, the entire science of statement analysis
(semiotics) is made up of statements about content (semologics) and statements about
cause and effects (pragmatics). Semologics in turn consists of syntactics, which is the internal relationship of a body of (legal) propositions with one another (in terms of consistency, economy, and degree of generality), and semantics, which is the external reference
of a proposition. See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at
267–69.
259 McDougal seems never to have defined the word “interdetermination” but used it
interchangeably with “interdependence,” as in the following sentence: “[The world community process] exhibits the same kinds of interdeterminations, the same kinds of interdependences, as our national processes.” Myres S. McDougal, International Law and the
Law of the Sea, in The Law of the Sea 3, 5 (Lewis M. Alexander ed., 1967).
260 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
188; Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective, in Studies in World Public Order 157, 165 (Myres S. McDougal ed., 1960)
[hereinafter McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law].
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cess of sharing and shaping eight basic values (power, enlightenment,
respect, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, and rectitude),261 the resolution of dispute over which may be accomplished within the world power
process, that is, authoritative decisions with international effects that are
enforced through severe deprivation or extreme indulgence.262 The
world power process is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the interactions of
the world community with its encompassed sub-communities.263 As
such, to be entirely contextual, it is essential to adopt proper procedures
that identify the source of decisions within this reciprocal interaction
and their effects on the distribution of community values.
Lasswell and McDougal introduce a quite sophisticated conceptual
apparatus to structure inquiry into context.264 First, to avoid normativeambiguity, policy-oriented jurisprudence recommends a clear distinction between what calls for an authoritative decision, that is, specific
events or value changes in social process precipitating conflicting
claims, and the decision itself.265 These decisions have both short-term
and long-term consequences for values. When some participants in the
world social process are threatened or deprived of certain values resulting from the actions of others which they call illegal, they call upon the
authoritative community decision-makers to apply certain prescriptions
of international law to restore any lost values.266 By weighing the claims
and counterclaims of the deprived and the depriver and interpreting
the prescriptions the parties have invoked to foster their claims, they
“invariably seek to make reasoned decisions by reference to common
policy and shared interests.”267
261 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
188–90.
262 See McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law, supra note 260, at
166–67.
263 The world power process, McDougal writes,
may . . . be insightfully viewed as a complex hierarchy of power processes of varying degrees of comprehension (global, hemispheric, regional, national, local),
with the more comprehensive affecting “inward” or “downward” the less comprehensive, and the latter in turn affecting “outward” or “upward” the former.
The metaphor of “nesting” tables or cups might be apt if such tables and cups
could be conceived as being in process of constant interaction and change.
Id. at 171.
264 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
21–38.
265 See id. at 30–31.
266 See McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law, supra note 260, at
167–68.
267 Id. at 168.
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Second, the legal scholar or decision-maker engages in a three-tier
analysis of “values,” “phase,” and “conditions.”268 These categories provide a reasonably full access to the values contested, knowledge about
participants with a claim over values, and the past, present, and future
of value distribution in the world power process.269 Under the value
category, McDougal holds that the observer or decision-maker ought to
consider the events leading to claims, the actual claims made over values, and all decision alternatives in terms of their policy implications or
value consequences.270 For instance, to distinguish between permissible
and impermissible coercion, a context-sensitive approach should ask to
what extent coercion was necessary to change the distribution of values
and how comprehensive the parties’ objectives were (consequentiality),
whether the coercion was to defend the established distribution of values or to change the existing setting (conservation or extension), and
to what degree the contested values were inclusive or exclusive.271
In the phase analysis, inquiry is made into “features,” “elements,”
or “aspects” of the process of any interaction through which men shape
and share values.272 In addition to community or social processes as a
whole, the value process, the process of legal or authoritative decisions,
the analysis of events, and the claim and decision processes, there are
seven categories that help dissect the specific features of each context.
These are: participants (who acted in varying roles that culminated in a
particular outcome?), perspectives (what were the expectations and
value demands of participants and who did they identify with?), situations (where and under what conditions were the participants interacting?), base value (what effective means were at the disposal of participants to achieve their objectives?), strategies (in what manner were this
means manipulated?), outcome (what was the immediate result of this
interaction for value allocation?), and finally, effect (what are the effects of different duration of the outcome of the interaction?).273
In the “conditions” or “conditions of context” analysis, McDougal
often refers to a number of additional factors relating to the location of
a particular context within the larger context of world power proc268 See McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 198.
269 See id.
270 See id.
271 See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, The International Law of
War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order 16–20 (1994) [hereinafter
McDougal & Feliciano, The International Law of War].
272 See McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 198.
273 See id.
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ess.274 For example, some factors affecting the authoritative process of
interpretation and application of international agreements include:
changes in the relative strength of contending visions of world public
order which commend persuasion or coercion as instruments of social
change, changes in the composition of territorial communities affecting the modalities of communication and common perception of
meaning, changes in the technology of communication, and changes
in strategies of cooperation in shaping and sharing values that may affect expectations about future modalities of such cooperation.275
This sketch of the role of context in a configurative jurisprudence
hardly does justice to the impressive precision with which a contextualoriented inquiry is de-limited by Lasswell and McDougal. So much has
already been said that it is unrealistic to expect a successful application
of such a complicated conceptual framework in practice. Even with a
masterfully crafted design of details of the indices affecting context, the
limitations of investigative resources hamper any attempts to account
for all variables that cause decisions and consider their respective consequences.276 A parsimonious selection of variables to account for,
though perhaps far from the ideal image of a scholar, is more reasonable for the practitioner of international law.277 McDougal’s proposal in
274 See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & James C. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and
Procedure 34 (1967) [hereinafter McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order].
275 See id.
276 This criticism comes from writers of the “incrementalist” school, most prominently
Charles Lindblom. He rejects the recommendation to examine all the variables that give
rise to specific decisions, or consider alternatives by way of investigation into their consequences for aggregate values, as utterly unrealistic. He instead recommends that the goals
in each decision-making process be limited to a few specific ones, and that a limited number of alternatives, which differ from one another only incrementally, be considered for
the advancement of those goals. See, e.g., Charles Lindblom & David Braybrooke, A
Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (1963); Charles Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959); see also Nicholas
Greenwood Onuf, Do Books of Reading Contribute to Scholarship?, 23 Int’l Org. 98 (1969).
277 Oscar Schachter writes about this from his own standpoint as a practitioner:
This brings me to still another prejudice of the international official—one
which he probably shares with others in practical affairs—that is, a bias in favor of deciding questions with reasonable dispatch and facility. This, we realize, is far from the ideal conception of a scholar. We have been told, for example, that one must consider all the conditioning factors that affect
decisions in the field of international law. . . . We have also been told that we
must take into account future developments and the impact of various alternatives on the whole range of basic values. But surely if we attempted to follow this counsel, even in small part, no decisions would ever be made on the
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fact reaches the outer limits of empirical possibility by requiring investigators to deal with eight value categories and seven phase categories
with attendant sub-categories, an open-ended list of conditions of context, and five dispositional factors specifically related to scientific thinking (culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis).
Valid as this critique may be, the impossibly demanding nature of
the empirical task is not the focus of this Article. The more interesting
point is to illustrate how the empirical potential of the conceptual apparatus of contextualism is indeed crippled under the shadow of a “postulated” value system of human dignity. McDougal’s recommended investigation into the pragmatics of cause and effect boils down to a
determination by a decision-maker of the balance of value systems and
an appraisal of alternatives to those decisions.278 The role of law in the
world power process is to ensure the conservation and expansion of the
preferred value system of human dignity, and the recommended phase
analysis with all its scrupulously defined subcategories must be utilized
to that end. No doubt legal semantics is unable to live up to this task.
But nothing in that suggests that the meaning of rules, as McDougal is
convinced, is radically indeterminate. Contextualism can afford to offer
an epistemic view within which meaning is determinable, if not invariably determinate. Pragmatics of context, therefore, is epistemically illucomplex issues of contemporary international life. From the point of view of
a participant—if not of a scholar—we must have a reasonably manageable
frame of reference; we must take account of the limits on our ability to obtain
and organize information and to look into the future; we must, in consequence, restrict our focus to relatively few variables and pay attention to perhaps only one or two major values in any specific situation. In short, it is not
wisdom (as Santayana observed) to be only wise, and it may not be rational to
introduce all the questions that should rationally be considered. For most of
them may be unanswerable.
Oscar Schachter, The International Official in a Divided World, 53 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 344,
348 (1959). McDougal seems to be aware of some of these problems, but never to have offered any practical suggestion as how to face them. See, e.g., McDougal et al., Theories About
International Law, supra note 30, at 286 (admitting to the difficulty of accounting for all goal
values and preferences, but also taking issue with the “incrementalist” thesis, which in its
strict form is unable to estimate “what is worth knowing” and appraise “the net benefits of
alternative benefits”); Myres S. McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The Balanced Opposites of a Legal System, in The Ethic of Power: The Interplay of Religion, Philosophy, and Politics 221, 238 (Harold Lasswell & Harlan Cleveland eds., 1962) [hereinafter McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority] (conceding the fact that she who
applies principles of content and procedure is ultimately responsible for using her creative
discretion to choose which values to consider, and that such principles will aid in the process
of selection).
278 See McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public
Order, supra note 274, at 34.
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minative of semantics. This is contrary to the policy-oriented approach
of Lasswell and McDougal, under which legal semantics is irremediably
indeterminate and indeterminable, and so disregarded and replaced
with pragmatics.279 Ironically, the consequences of McDougal’s recommended pragmatic context analysis in its most precise form are not contingent on context, but instead guided by a set of non-reflective values
or “preferred events” which themselves are not context-dependent.280
They are thus no less unwarranted or rigid than what McDougal avoids
in the foundationalism of semantics.
B. A Re-Assessment of the Role of Context in Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence
As noted earlier, Lasswell and McDougal’s masterly detailed articulation of a conceptual framework for context-analysis triggered a good
deal of skepticism, much of which related to the demanding empirical
task involved.281 A more interesting critique of Lasswell’s original design of a framework for contextual-orientation, however, asks some difficult questions about the rationale behind devising the categories and
sub-categories as introduced by policy science.282 This is particularly
crucial with regard to the value category and its eight subsumptive sets
of values which I will take up in the next part. Here, I intend to illustrate how, in the New Haven Jurisprudence, pragmatics neither complements semantics nor in fact addresses occurring cases of semantic
indeterminacy to provide interpretive remedy, but instead is substituted
for semantics. Because, as will be shown, the value category in the last
analysis outruns other categories in the McDougalian contextual apparatus to find answers to legal cases, contextual-orientation is in effect
tantamount to the preservation of values of human dignity. This, however, is nothing more than a trite observation regarding policy-oriented
international law, known to any dilettante with the most cursory ac279 See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 268.
280 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
335–36.
281 See Tipson supra, note 31, at 537.
282 A critic takes Lasswell’s failure to give any explanation as to how he arrived at these
categories, which he introduces as the conceptual tools for context analysis, to be “mere ‘intellectuality’ in science,” arbitrary, and “the result of intellect ‘culling’ ideas from all other
minds engaged in solving problems of substance without Professor Lasswell having the benefit of experiencing that process.” Arthur J. Brodbeck, Scientific Heroism from a Standpoint Within
Social Psychology, in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, supra note 115, at 245. The result is a set of concepts received with no more than “cold
empathy,” leaving the reader desiring to know about Lasswell’s own creativity in selecting
some concepts rather than others. Id.
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quaintance with its value-oriented configurative jurisprudence. Furthermore, the primacy of values of human dignity over all other contextual factors does not in and of itself negate the context-sensitivity of
McDougal’s approach, though it certainly affects its efficacy. The problem appears only when such justifying values remain unjustified in a
context-transcendent manner, betraying epistemic irresponsibility on
the part of advocates of values of human dignity. The upshot is not only
universalizing the particular, but more importantly, presenting answers
to cases, hard or not, that are as predictable as any diehard literal reading of semantics may produce. The examples below will demonstrate
this point.
In a comprehensive series of four volumes on world public order,
McDougal and his collaborators set a prime example of the level of sophistication involved in any contextual analysis.283 Applied to the general jurisprudence of a particular doctrinal field, the grand task is no
impediment to a “systematic”284 effort to capture various constituents of
283 See McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, supra note 95;
McDougal & Feliciano, The International Law of War, supra note 271, at 71; Myres S.
McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Ivan A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space
(1963); McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order, supra note 274. In order to recommend the method by which decision-makers should
determine basic community values, and alternatives thereof to address each respective problem area, these volumes place values in their most comprehensive context as follows: They
first offer a phase and value analysis to establish (1) the process by which the values of space
and oceans are shaped and shared, coercion inflicted, or agreement reached; (2) the process
of claims and counterclaims regarding each particular area and the problems faced by decision-makers having to choose between the conflicting claims; and (3) the process of decision,
related to the area in question, by which contraposed claims are resolved. This is followed by
an examination of the larger context of conditions in which each process occurs. McDougal
and his associates then go on to recommend basic community policy or policies to guide
decision-makers in balancing existing claims in the relevant area. The subsequent chapters
take this analysis to a more specific level regarding particular problems in the area under
examination, finally recommending the intellectual tasks designed to help the scholar scientifically understand the history of the problematique (trend) and alternative possibilities,
given the already-clarified goals of the scholar and the desired direction of the future. Trend
analysis itself requires a contextual analysis of the past, similar to what the decision-maker is
advised to do for present decisions. This should attest to the level of sophistication in
McDougal’s recommended contextual analysis. For works by colleagues or followers of the
NHS who have adopted this mode of inquiry, see, for example, Douglas M. Johnston, The
International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiries (1968);
B.S. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion (1968); William T. Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor
International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry, in Essays on Intervention 37 (Roland Stanger
ed., 1964).
284 However apt a description “systematic” is, it still must be qualified. Sometimes the
subject matter does not lend itself to the application of conceptual categories, such as in
McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, supra note 95, at 453–62, where
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context by McDougal and his associates through the designated proper
categories.285 This degree of comprehensive coverage of contextual
categories, however, barely sustains when McDougal addresses specific
cases in order to assess their legal status in practice.286 For instance,
consider McDougal’s recommended contextual analysis of the lawfulness of coercion, in which the decision-maker ought to consider the
events, claims, and decision alternatives to assess the short-term, middle-range, and long-term proposed or actual consequences for community values.287 Together with this is a consideration of the particular
event leading to the claim under investigation so far as the phase category and conditions of context are concerned.288 More concretely,
when considering participants in an incident of coercion, their “fighting capabilities, composition of internal elites, concentration of power
in internal structures of authority, [and] ideological affiliation” are at
stake.289 The decision-maker must take into account the participants’
objectives, the importance of the goals pursued (whether they bear major or minor changes to the existing order), the expansion or conservation of values, and the sharability of values.290 The conditions of context include some “more important factors of fairly obvious significance
[for] . . . appraising lawfulness [of coercion] . . . expectations about the
nature of the available technology of violence, and about the relative
probabilities of effective community intervention, and the kind of public order demanded by the respective participants.”291 McDougal directs the decision-maker to inquire (1) not only into which participant
fired the first shot, but also into whether such an act was justified under
the circumstances; (2) into which participant accepted community intervention more readily; and (3) into the “degree of conformity” that
McDougal’s discussion of the background “acts” relating to the width of territorial sea is
not conducive to categorization. At other times, there is no analysis of the process of decision, and the claims are discussed merely insofar as what they entail.
285 See, e.g., McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World
Public Order, supra note 274, at 14–21 (dividing the context of international agreements
into the following categories: participants, objectives, situations, base values, strategies,
outcomes, effects, and conditions).
286 See, e.g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 598–600 (discussing Article 51 in terms of customary rights instead of contextual analysis).
287 See McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order, supra note
187, at 820–23.
288 See id. at 779–91.
289 See McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority, supra note 277, at 235 (emphasis added).
290 Id. at 235–36.
291 McDougal & Feliciano, The International Law of War, supra note 271, at 183.
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the decision-maker expects to secure if “a characterization of impermissibility” is to be made.292
In response to Quincy Wright and other critics of the U.S. quarantine of Cuba,293 McDougal argued for the legality of the quarantine
based on a new interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Charter).294 While Wright argued that the United States was not
responding to an “armed attack” and thus was not entitled to a defensive use of armed force,295 McDougal scoffed at the strict interpretation
of Article 51 by virtue of which the customary right of self-defense is
limited to the actual cases of an armed attack.296 Invoking the “plain
and natural” language of Article 51 quite curiously, McDougal accuses
the proponents of a strict reading of Article 51 of “word-juggling” and
“substitut[ing] for the words ‘if an armed attack occurs’ the very different words ‘if, and only if, an armed attack occurs’.”297 McDougal repeated his earlier arguments for the right to anticipatory self-defense in
Law and Minimum World Public Order to offer a different reading of Article 51 reflecting the customary limitations of necessity and proportionality on the right to self-defense298 and concluded:
292 See id. at 206.
293 See Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 546 (1963). For more
on Professor Wright’s position, see also Quincy Wright, Non-Military Intervention, in The
Relevance of International Law 5, 13 (Karl Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1971).
294 McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 603.
295 See Wright, supra note 293, at 560–61.
296 See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 599.
297 Id. at 600. Leo Gross turns this argument against McDougal, claiming that McDougal himself could also rightfully be accused of word-juggling, as his comments could be
read as follows: “Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence, if, but not
only if, an armed attack occurs . . . .” Leo Gross, Problems of International Adjudication and
Compliance with International Law: Some Simple Solutions, 59 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 53 (1965).
298 See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 598. As McDougal puts it:
The more important limitations imposed by the general community upon
this customary right of self-defense have been . . . those of necessity and proportionality. The conditions of necessity . . . have never . . . been restricted to
“actual armed attack”; imminence of attack of such high degree as to preclude effective resort by the intended victim to nonviolent modalities of response have always been regarded as sufficient justification, and it is now
generally recognized that a determination of imminence requires an appraisal of an initiating state’s coercive activities upon the target state’s expectations about the cost of preserving its territorial integrity and political independence. Even the highly restrictive language of Secretary of State Webster
in the Caroline case, specifying a “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation,” did not
require “actual armed attack,” and the understanding is now widespread that
a test formulated in the previous century . . . is hardly relevant to contempo-
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Even this impressionistic recall of some of the more salient
features of the larger context of threat and response should
suffice to suggest that a third-party observer, genuinely concerned to clarify the common interests of all peoples, could
reasonably conclude that the action taken by the United
States was in accord with traditional general community expectations about the requirements of self-defense. The flow of
pertinent comment and decision since the incident would indeed seem to confirm that this has been the overwhelming
conclusion of world public opinion.299
The “impressionistic” examination of the larger context of the necessity and proportionality of the imposition of quarantine took into
account the fact that the countermeasure was aimed against the U.S.S.R.
and not against Cuba, and that, far from being egocentric, it was endorsed by the Organization of American States (participants).300 While
the Soviet objectives were expansionist, the United States was responsible for securing the elimination of nuclear weapons from Cuba.301 The
general geographic area was of strategic concern to the United States
and other countries in the hemisphere (situation), as historically expressed through the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, expectations of a
crisis in the world arena were high and the estimates for an effective response from the organized community of states were low.302 The outcome of the Soviet’s act, almost within its reach, was a new, more direct
military threat to the whole of the Americas, while the quarantine was a
reversible action causing no irremediable destruction.303 It is true that
none of these contextual factors are considered in comparison to the
counterclaims of the adversary as a genuine contextual-oriented analysis
would require and that McDougal’s drawing on geographically harmonious foreign affairs interests in light of, inter alia, the Monroe Doctrine
is simply ahistorical and, further, that the magnificence of the actual
quarantine vis-à-vis the perceived threat is trivialized simply as “reversible.” What is more illuminating, however, is two-fold.
rary controversies, involving high expectations of violence, between nucleararmed protagonists.
Id.

299 Id. at 603.
300 See id. at 601–02.
301 See id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 602–03.
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First, McDougal’s reliance on the language of Article 51 to justify
the legality of the quarantine is highly curious.304 It is perhaps one of
the reasons a reviewer once accused him of legalism with a “conservative turn of mind,” a characterization with which it is hard to quarrel.305
As far as the interpretation and application of Article 51 to the Cuban
crisis are concerned, however, McDougal makes no effort to employ the
roster of contextual indices, drawn up impressionistically or not, to determine the meaning of Article 51. Beyond word juggling or an otherwise unwarranted assumption about the embodiment of anticipatory
self-defense in Article 51,306 McDougal makes no use of a contextual
approach to establish that the Charter did not in fact supersede the
right to preemptive self-defense allegedly derived from custom. The
contextual analysis is merely limited to the question of facts—whether
the initial event was sufficient to give rise to a justified right to anticipatory self-defense, given the participants, objectives and so on—and in
no way extends to determine the meaning of Article 51.307 Notwithstanding the semantics and application of Article 51, McDougal does
not even apply the conceptual framework of context analysis to empirically verify the customary status of anticipatory self-defense. In fact, only two years before the Cuban quarantine, McDougal wrote of a need

304 Ironically enough, not even the U.S. government made any attempt to use Article
51 to justify the Cuban quarantine. The State Department’s then-Deputy Legal Adviser,
Leonard Meeker, later summarized the Government’s position as follows:
[I]t may be noted that the United States, in adopting the defensive quarantine
of Cuba, did not seek to justify it as a measure required to meet an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51. Nor did the United States seek to sustain
its action on the grounds that Article 51 is not an all-inclusive statement of the
right of self-defense and that the quarantine was a measure of self-defense open
to any country to take individually for its own defense in a case other than an
“armed attack.” Indeed, as shown by President Kennedy’s television address of
October 22[, 1962,] and by other statements of the Government, reliance was
not placed on either contention, and the United States took no position on either of these issues.
Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 515, 523 (1963).
305 See D.P. O’Connell, Book Review, 4 Sydney L. Rev. 318, 318 (1964) (reviewing
Myres S. McDougal & F.P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The
Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961) and Myres S. McDougal,
Studies in World Public Order (1960)). Without elaborating further, O’Connell writes:
“McDougal, despite all his social science language, and his dedication to relativism, is in
fact excessively legalistic and of a fundamentally conservative turn of mind.” Id.
306 See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 600.
307 See id. at 602–03 (applying a contextual framework to the factual scenario of the
Cuban crisis).
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for “redefinition” or a less restrictive view of anticipatory self-defense,308
and it is not clear how mysteriously such a broad view would gain widespread recognition in the short term.309 It is worth noting that one may
object to the distinction between questions of facts and law as contradicting the basic principles of viewing law as a process of authoritative
and controlling decisions—perhaps disguised positivism. Such an objection is without force, however, because it is precisely the absence of
factual grounds in interpreting the law that renders McDougal’s project
of contextual-orientation meaningless for legal interpretation.310
308 McDougal & Feliciano, The International Law of War, supra note 271, at 67.
According to the authors:
The traditional requirements imposed upon resort to self-defense—a realistic
expectation of instant, imminent military attack . . . —may . . . require some
redefinition to take into account the potentialities of the newer technology of
violence. From this perspective, the emphasis in the United Nations Charter
upon “armed attack” as the precipitating event for the legitimate recourse to
self-defense may appear most unrealistic.
Id.

309 In fact, in her review of the U.N. debates about self-defense from its founding to
1963, Rosalyn Higgins concludes that:
In virtually all those instances where a right of anticipated self-defense has
been specifically in issue . . . the United Nations has preferred not to give rein
to the doctrine. This does not, however, warrant the assumption that Article
51 has restricted this right as laid down in The Caroline; there has merely been
a reluctance on the part of the United Nations to encourage it, for fear it may
be too fraught with danger for the basic policy of peace and stability.

Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political
Organs of the United Nations 203 (1963).
310 It is helpful here to compare, in some length, Richard Falk’s inquiry into the legality of the 1968 Israeli raid on the Beirut airport, during which Israeli soldiers destroyed all
commercial aircraft belonging to Arab Airlines in retaliation for Arab commando actions
against El Al Airline. See generally Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of
Retaliation, 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 415 (1969). On the doctrinal level (the Charter and subsequent U.N. re-affirmations thereof), Falk asserts, “Israel is not entitled to exercise a right
of [forcible] reprisal in modern international law.” Id. at 430. While the law “seems clear”
on this point, he continues, “[s]uch clarity . . . serves mainly to discredit doctrinal approaches to legal analysis. International society is not sufficiently organized to eliminate
forcible self-help in either its sanctioning or deterrent roles.” Id. This fact regarding the
expectations of the “international society” ought to be considered when judging the legality of the Israeli actions. Falk thus draws on the precedent of February 1969, another Israeli attack against Arab commando bases in Syria:
Evidently, for instance, the attacks on the Syrian bases resulted in fairly large
Arab casualties and yet failed to provoke any sense of international opposition
to the Israeli action. An attack of this kind on bases seems well assimilated . . .
into the structure of international expectations about tolerable levels of ArabIsraeli violence, given current levels and forms of conflict and hostility.
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Second, though the value category occupies an independent
framework alongside other categories in the McDougalian conceptual
scheme for contextualism, it is hardly an overstatement to note that it
in fact colonizes the implications of all the other categories in its normative grasp.311 The clearly articulated constituent elements of context,
the identification of participants, the assessment of their objectives,
perspectives, situations, base values, strategies employed, and outcome
and effects, all take place on a bedrock of binary opposition between
the universally sharable values of human dignity and the totalitarianizing values of human indignity. The identification of a participant with
either of the two dominant visions of world public order, and the characterization of its objectives and perspectives and the effects of the
claims and decisions simply leaves no room for a holistic understanding
of context. No sooner is a participant identified on either side of the
Id. at 420. So given public expectations about a tolerable level of violence in the ArabIsraeli relationship, these expectations give rise to a valid second level of legal inquiry. As
Falk puts it:
As a technical matter, Charter law is properly accorded priority over inconsistent rules of customary international law. . . . However, the inability of the
United Nations to impose its views of legal limitation upon states leads to a
kind of second-order level of legal inquiry that is guided by the more permissive attitudes toward the use of force to uphold national interests that is contained in customary international law. . . . Even second-order [level of] legal
inquiry may be ill-adapted to the kind of retaliatory claim being made by Israel . . . and a third-order legal inquiry involving the specification of considerations bearing on the relative legal status of a particular retaliatory claim
[may be necessary].
Id. at 430–31 n.39. On the third level of inquiry, Falk offers a set of indicators to assess the
legality of Israeli claims, indicators (which are mainly specifications and adaptations of
customary norms) that unlike customary norms, would “overcome[e] the dichotomy between war and peace, and would be more sensitive to the continuities of terroristic provocation and retaliatory response such as are evident in the Middle East.” See id. at 435. Based
on these indicators, Falk notes the Israeli Beirut raid as unreasonable and thus illegal. Id.
at 439–40.
The difference between McDougal’s and Falk’s applications of “general public expectations” as a contextual factor in assessing the legal status of an incident of coercion should
be obvious. While Falk’s process-oriented approach has no difficulty severing the link between public expectations and the law of the Charter to suggest different orders of inquiry,
McDougal’s invocation of the text of the Charter draws on facts on the ground not to determine the meaning of Article 51 but to decide the urgency of preemption and then provide a Charter-based rationalization. Absent from the former is a clear articulation of the
legal basis for lower levels of inquiry, as well as any regard for contextual interpretation of
the existing law. The latter, however, is in sheer disregard of contextualism at the core of a
policy-oriented international law. Neither one takes the elements of context affecting the
interpretation of the law of Charter seriously.
311 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 169.
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value pole than the idea of holistic reasoning in context is nipped in
the bud. None of this is to suggest that, in a sly rationalization of desideratum, McDougal manipulates the conceptual apparatus of context to
reach his favored policy consequences.312 Rather, the claim is that, taken to its logical conclusion, the reign of value judgment over all other
variables of context and the fixity of value demarcation in the policyoriented approach neither can nor does leave any hope for a genuinely
contextual-oriented jurisprudence.
The rigidification of context is by no means limited to the law of
the use of force. While rejecting international law jurisprudence on the
termination of treaties for either overemphasizing consent or unrealistically terminating agreements unilaterally, McDougal suggests an organization of “systemic inquiry into the prescription and practice by
which the decision-makers of nation-states terminate . . . agreements”
that “distinguishes between termination which is based on mutual consent and termination” based on the grounds of changed conditions.313
An inquiry that is both cognizant of the past practice of the decisionmakers of nation-states and amenable to securing policy preferences
should seek an “appropriate balance between the honoring of the reasonable expectations of the parties to agreements . . . and the permitting
or encouraging of a continual, progressive reformulation of policies to
keep them in accord with the changing perspective and conditions of
the parties.”314 On its face, the recommended balancing work between
the “reasonable expectations” of the parties and the dynamic interrelations of policy preferences could be best achieved in a comprehensive
contextual framework of inquiry.315 But understanding that “reasonable expectations” in international agreements are limited to those that
are recognized as such by the interpreters in light of their compatibility
with, and potential for, the advancement of values of human dignity,316
312 This is the critique Louis Henkin makes specifically regarding McDougal’s invocation
of Article 51 in the case of Cuban quarantine. See Louis Henkin, Remarks, 57 Am. Int’l L.
Proc. 147, 165–69 (1963). For a similar critique, see also Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of
International Lawyers, 2 Int’l L. 591, 593–99 (1968) (discussing McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations, supra note 42). Chimni goes so far as to suggest that “McDougal’s
jurisprudence appears to give the impression of working itself backwards from this point,
putting together elements which in combination can provide some form of intellectual rationalisation and justification for every action that the United States undertakes.” Chimni,
supra note 151, at 140.
313 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 211–12.
314 Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
315 See id. at 211–12.
316 See McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public
Order, supra note 274, at 44.
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the application of rebus sic stantibus cannot rest on a myriad of contextual variables independent of the determinative consequences of the
value bipolarity in the New Haven Jurisprudence.
Likewise, against the confusion surrounding the admission of newly-emerged, territorially-organized political bodies to the arenas of formal authority of existing nation-states, McDougal recommends a distinction between the facts to which decision-makers respond and the
ensuing consequences of their response in order to rescue “recognition”
from all the “normative-ambiguity” that surrounds it.317 A comprehensive inquiry conducive to the clarification of the concept should first
examine “what access official decision-makers . . . of newly emerged
bodies politic have to established arenas of formal authority prior to
ceremony of recognition and what new access to such arenas and other
advantages they obtain after such ceremony.”318 An inquiry should also
be made into “what policies in terms of legitimacy, constitutionalism,
willingness to perform international obligations, and so on, the decision-makers in established nation-states have in fact sought and achieved
in granting or withholding recognition in respect to newly emerged
bodies politic.”319 Instead of focusing on the ceremony of recognition as
the “outmoded survival of earlier power processes,” it is rational to devise new collective modes of recognition based on “criteria compatible
with an international law of human dignity.”320 In the process of establishing a collective mode of recognition, so the argument goes, the history of granting or withdrawing recognition and their resulting consequences, as well as the effects resulting from each new act of
recognition, must be evaluated in terms of their correspondence with
the preferred values of human dignity.321
At times, it may seem that McDougal favors the process of contextual interpretation not to respond to any semantic limitations of legal
rules, but to ensure that the outcome of the process of legal decisionmaking is taken seriously.322 What may seem to be a concern for fostering compliance, however, is no more than a reductive employment of
contextual flexibilities and confinement of the great potentials of con317 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 197.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 198.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 See, e.g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 601 ( juxtaposing
concerns about acceptability of a strict reading of self-defense rights with concerns about
minimizing coercion and violence).
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text to the determinative demands of value judgment. McDougal’s view
on the width of the continental shelf is a fine case in point. The Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the shelf as the “seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres . . . or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas,”323 McDougal criticized
the precise “200 metre” standard and argued for the vaguer standard of
“exploitability:”
It is true that the outer limit placed upon the exploitability
criterion is most imprecisely indicated by restricting application of the standard to “adjacent” submarine areas; we do not
share the curious view that the additional provision of the 200meter depth . . . remedies this imprecision . . . . The degree of
vagueness in the exploitability criterion, deplored by all
commentators, seems nevertheless much less likely to produce
consequential tension than would a criterion which, while certain and precise, would also limit coastal authority to only part
of an exploitable area.324
Contrary to the objections against McDougal for favoring openended standards, all of which focus on the threat that a McDougalian
framework would pose to the rule of law,325 it must be noted that the
“exploitability” criterion could indeed reduce the possibility of “consequential tension” by considering the changing exploitation capabilities
of states. Such a standard is characteristically future-oriented and not
captured in the past. This is in line with the objectives of a policyoriented international law that views experience of the past as a guide
to wisdom about the future and yet expects the decision-makers to project a distribution of values, in view of community goals, into the future.326 Yet as characteristic as the future-orientation of the exploitabil323 McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, supra note 95, at 685
n.376.
324 Id. at 687.
325 See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning
of International Law: An Intermediate View, in The Relevance of International Law, supra
note 293, at 133, 140; Brownlie, supra note 105, at 1055; Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Law and
Minimum World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano and Public World
Order of the Oceans by Myres S. McDougal and W. T. Burke, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 614–15
(1964) (book review); Quincy Wright, Studies in World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal and
Associates, 39 U. Det. L.J. 145, 148 (1961).
326 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 183–84.
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ity standard is, it is over-determinative in application. A McDougalian
decision-maker entrusted to project a distribution of values into the
future consonant with community goals when interpreting and applying the exploitability standard in a particular case must take into account the participants, their objectives, perspectives, and situations, and
the effects and outcomes of the distribution in question.327 With the
bipolarity of value systems and the often ex ante assignment of participants and their objectives to either side of the pole, it is no longer a
matter of contextual interpretation to predict how the exploitability
standard would be used as a guide to determine cases in practice.
On other occasions, however, contextual interpretation addresses
what McDougal identifies as normative-ambiguity surrounding the application of rules.328 The application of Article 27(3) of the Charter to
the Security Council Resolutions of June 1950 (Resolutions) condemning the Korean attack and authorizing the members of the United Nations (U.N.) to furnish necessary assistance to the Republic of South
Korea to repel the attack and restore international peace is an exemplary case in which McDougal criticized those who purported to find a
“literal” “or “objective” meaning in Article 27(3).329 In a heated style,
McDougal contends that commentators who find that the Soviet absence and lack of concurring vote renders the Resolutions invalid understand Article 27(3)’s provision that decisions of the Security Council
on all matters other than procedural “shall be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members” to mean “the concurring votes of all five permanent
members, who must be present and voting.”330 Such commentators are
guilty of the “fallacy of univocalism” by thinking that Article 27(3) has
unambiguous meaning in no need of interpretation, and of the “fallacy
of detailism” in trying to project “a minutely detailed intent into the
future” where subsequent interpreters will give priority to that intent
over more general objectives.331
In a characteristically inflated representation of the opponent,
McDougal is here responding to an argument by Leo Gross, who, ra327 See id. at 182–83.
328 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 149–57 (discussing the limitations of “unambiguous meanings” in the context of North Korea’s attack
on South Korea in 1950).
329 See Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 Yale L.J. 258, 266–67 (1951) [hereinafter McDougal & Gardner, The
Veto and the Charter].
330 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 149.
331 Id. at 151–52.
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ther than invoke a literal meaning for Article 27(3), in fact seeks to offer an interpretation thereof that is compatible with the policies and
purposes of the drafters as well as the history of the subsequent practice
of the U.N.332 By making a distinction between abstention and absence
and giving a privileged position to the principle of unanimity—which
by virtue of established practice, and in fact contrary to a strict reading
of the Charter, has been understood not to be tarnished by abstention—Gross is after a purposive interpretation of Article 27(3).333 He
seems to give equal weight to the original intent334 and the evolution of
the relevant practice of the U.N. members to conclude that the interpretation of Article 27(3), “like other such questions which have arisen
in the past, . . . is believed to be susceptible of objective and judicial determination.”335 This, of course, is different from what McDougal considers to be the defect in the argument against the legality of the Resolutions, namely, the underlying “assumption that the words of Article
27(3) have an ‘unambiguous’ meaning which makes their interpretation unnecessary.”336 McDougal’s charge derives from his skepticism
about “ordinary meaning,” a skepticism about whose implications he
nevertheless remains inconsistent.337 It is fair to say that McDougal’s
332 See Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from
Meetings, 60 Yale L.J. 209, 209–11 (1951).
333 See id. at 256. Gross argues:
This principle [of unanimity] is satisfied, of course, by an affirmative and
concurring vote—that is by express consent to the proposed Security Council
action. It is also satisfied by abstention—that is by tacit consent to the Council
action. It is not satisfied when there is neither express nor tacit consent to the
proposed Council action. . . . The same cannot be said of absences.
Id.

334 Id. (concluding that interpretations of Article 27(3) that equate absence with abstention find very little support in the Article’s text or history).
335 Id. at 257.
336 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 151.
337 McDougal seems to accept the implications of “ordinary meaning” when he says:
Unless persuasive evidence is established to the contrary, assume that the
terms of an agreement are intended to be understood as they are generally
understood by the largest audience contemporary to the agreement to which
both parties belong. The probabilities are that the more people who share a
meaning, the more likely the particular parties are to have had that meaning.
McDougal, et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order,
supra note 274, at 59. Elsewhere, he notes:
Unless there are excellent grounds for the view that some idiosyncratic meaning was shared by the agreement-makers, the community decision-maker is
justified in adopting, preliminarily, the ordinary usages that were current in
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search for the purposes of the provision under controversy looks into
the present and future of the U.N. and its survival, whereas Gross hankers after such purposes as established at the time of the drafting and
evolution of the Charter.338 The divide is less a difference in their regard for context than it is a difference considering context both as it is
already shaped and as it ought to be shaped by appropriate policy
choices.
Neither this particular controversy nor the aptitude of McDougal’s
depiction of his opponent as oblivious to context need detain us any
longer. Nor are we concerned with a consideration of McDougal’s rejection of “ordinary language,”339 beyond noting that in this case, as in the
Cuban quarantine, his censure of misreading the text is at best curious.
One should ask, what if Article 51 of the Charter did in fact read “if, and
only if, an armed attack occurs,” or Article 27(3) in fact read, “the concurring votes of all five permanent members, who must be present and
voting?” If semantics cannot afford to furnish any degree of closure under any circumstances, why does McDougal still take the trouble of word
juggling at all? Whatever ambivalence there may be about dispensing
with the text altogether, the crucial point is that the considerations of
context are not supposed to bear any relevance to determining the semantics of the text.340 What McDougal hopes to make persuasive is:
[T]hat the language of Article 27(3) can dictate no particular
interpretation and that any decision about the constitutionality
of the Korean resolutions, whether for or against, must depend upon policy choices—and policy choices that may be
made with varying degrees of consciousness and, hence, also
with varying degrees of rational consideration of relevant factors.341
the appropriate audiences. . . . When private parties enter into arrangements
that they expect to make effective in case of dispute by involving the decisionmakers of the community, it is reasonable to ask that they employ words with
“public” rather than esoteric significations.
Id. at 69.
338 Compare McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 152 (concluding that “the words of an international agreement cannot be taken as timeless absolutes” but must be contextualized), with Gross, supra note 332, at 251–53 (examining the
discussions surrounding Article 27(3) at the San Francisco Conference to draft the U.N.
Charter).
339 For an interesting critique of McDougal’s rejection of “ordinary meaning” and his
behavioristic theory of semantics that views reality as non-verbal, see Chimni, supra note
151, at 83–99.
340 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 155.
341 Id. (emphasis added).
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“Rational consideration of relevant factors” could indeed guide the interpreter to vistas of the future where relevance of the law survives the passage of time, but this could happen only if it is not pigeonholed in an
unjustified bipolar evaluative framework. To McDougal, the legality of
the Resolutions is a matter of “interpretation for survival,”342 but at the
time, one could just as well have put on the table other possibilities for
consideration—whether unanimity would not be more germane to the
survival of the U.N., for instance. The threshold of inquiry, however,
was cut too short to give way to such questions, as the divide between
the two poles of values painted a natural face to much of what was well
in need of justification.
Overall, McDougal expects the contextualist framework to address
three kinds of indeterminacy.343 The first relates to his rejection of “ordinary meaning” —rules come in words, and words possess no “ordinary meaning.”344 The second class, which is the most interesting of all
but is not discussed here, derives from complementarity of norms or
concepts—norms come in pairs of opposites.345 Finally, regardless of
these two cases, a rule must be tested each time afresh for conformity
to the expectations of parties through empirical methods of social science (such as content analysis, mass interviews, and participant observation).346 McDougal draws no distinction between different causes of
indeterminacy when recommending a policy-oriented, contextualist
framework.347 It must be assumed, therefore, that a policy-oriented
scholar or decision-maker does not employ contextual factors to address indeterminacy understood as a matter of degree, but rather taken
as an inclusively pervasive character of meaning. Nor is she to apply any
sorts of discrimination in selecting the relevant contextual factors or
their application based on the specific source of indeterminacy in a
342 McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter, supra note 329, at 258.
343 Id. at 263–69.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 266–68.
346 See McDougal et al., The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public
Order, supra note 274, at xviii. The authors note:
The approach which seeks genuine shared expectations does not neglect the
words of a purportedly final text, if any exists. It does, however, regard any initial version of their relation to shared expectations as provisional, and requires that the interpreter engage in a course of sustained testing and revision of preliminary inferences about the pertinent subjectivities. And of
course this calls for scrutiny of the whole context of communication.
Id.

347 See id.
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particular case. What is certain is that in none of the cases, regardless of
the specific source of indeterminacy, are contextual indices used by
McDougal to help interpret the text (which may after all be considered
as the original point in the process of interpretation).348 Instead, they
are used to (re)construct a factual ground which will in turn serve to
justify the desired, ad hoc application of a rule or standard.
To take stock, I am pursuing a two-fold argument with no parity of
emphasis. The first, and less cardinal one to the overall thesis about the
crippled contextualist claims of the NHS, is an argument about a complete disjunction between pragmatics and semantics in McDougal’s
scheme of contextual interpretation. The second, and central argument to the critique of the NHS’s contextualism, seeks to expose the
(over-)determinative role of the value category in McDougalian contextualism, and thereby, to reveal the futility of its sophisticated conceptual
framework.
On the relationship between semantics and pragmatics in the contextual framework designed by policy-oriented jurisprudence, despite
his self-avowed skepticism about the possibility of inferring any determinate meaning from the text, a great deal of ambivalence could be
detected in McDougal’s treatment of language of the law.349 Even in
cases where he finds that the text is a good starting point, McDougal
does not find it necessary, in theory or in practice, to employ contextual factors to determine a meaning for the text with any minimal consideration of the text itself.350 Instead, a series of contextual indices is
used to construct a factual situation which is then considered to demand a particular (and consistently predictable) reading of the text.351
Contextual factors are used to construct, rather than establish, a factual
situation, as the value category is largely determinative of the overall
348 See id. at 97. The authors point out:
Although there is no reason to deny the usefulness of the common or public
meanings of words as starting points in the process of interpretation, whenever
a principle emphasizing such meanings threatens to become transformed into a
final, exclusive procedure, it must be rejected. No acceptable justification can
be given for precluding an interpreter, whose goal is to determine the shared
expectations of the authors of a document, from proceeding to examine all of
the relevant features of the context prior to final decision.
Id.

349 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 94–95.
350 Cf. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 42, at 599–603 (analyzing Article 51 of U.N. Charter in light of customary self-defense rights and the factors of a single,
contextualized situation).
351 See, e.g., id. at 601–03.
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structure of the facts as presented.352 As soon as the events and claims
under investigation are assessed against the bipolar value category, the
factual situation is by and large constructed around the result of that
assessment, leaving little room for any further significant interpretive
labor.353
Pragmatics, however, need not be severed from semantics in a context-sensitive interpretive practice. Outside a foundationalist zone
where one does not expect to find the comfort of semantic foundations
to make meaning fully determinate, the work of interpretation makes
use of pragmatics to find contingent, contextually determined semantics from within, rather than without, language.
On the (over-)determinative role of the values of human dignity in
McDougal’s design of contextual-orientation, a bipolar evaluative category permeates the whole enterprise of contextual analysis with consequences fatal to a project of contextual-orientation. The reasoning of a
decision-maker or scholar in any number of particular cases follows a
consistent pattern: first constructing the facts based on contextual categories, dominant among which is the value category, and then considering the optimum decision or recommendation as one that would best
maintain and advance values of human dignity. In this process, before
the investigative analysis of all the potentially relevant contextual factors begins, it is foreclosed by a predictable assignment of those elements to either side of the evaluative divide between human dignity
and indignity. Consequently, the entire detailed design of contextual
categories is certain to lead to inordinately predictable results.
This over-determination of legal analysis is more striking if one recalls the unjustified status of the values of human dignity and their association with Western liberal democracies against totalitarianism of the
East. The preservation of the interests of the United States and its Western allies in the New Haven Jurisprudence does not presage the vanishing predictive power of law in the way it has occupied much of the critiques of Yale’s policy-oriented jurisprudence.354 It is not a threat to the
352 See, e.g., id. (contrasting the “totalitarian character” of the Soviet Union with the “democratic internal structures” of the United States to frame the discussion of the quarantine).
353 See, e.g., id. at 603 (“Even this impressionistic recall . . . of the larger context of
threat and response should suffice to suggest . . . that the action taken by the United States
was in accord with . . . the requirements of self-defense.”)
354 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 45, at 382. Anderson boldly objects:
The words of the law become mere wisps of sight or sound. Law is policy. Policy is human dignity. Human dignity is fostered in the long run by the success
of American foreign policy. Therefore, law is the handmaiden of the national
interest of the United States. . . . Law becomes merely an increment to power.
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stability or predictability of international law in a world of competing
interests. On the contrary, it makes policy-oriented decision-making as
predictable as, if not more than, semantic foundationalism. The problem thus lies in the over-determinacy of policy analysis, rather than in
the oft-deplored indeterminacy of law in the policy-oriented jurisprudence.
Against the claim that the over-determinacy of policy analysis is the
logical conclusion of the unjustified epistemic status of values of human
dignity and the centrality of those values in McDougal’s contextual
framework of inquiry, one could anticipate two valid questions. First,
how could providing justification for normative values of human dignity precisely remedy the over-determinative implications of “rational
considerations of relevant factors” in a policy-oriented jurisprudence of
international law? Second, what modes of inquiry are available for a
pragmatic, problem-oriented jurisprudence of international law to seek
justification for normative values in a non-foundational yet cognitive
state?
Epistemic justification of values of human dignity in a manner
compatible with the overall contextualist framework of a policy-oriented
international law would impact both the inventory of values represented
as indices of human dignity and the modality in which various participants in the world arena are seen to respect and adhere to, or violate
and deny, such values. Grounded in context, relevant values may vary
according to the context in use. The list, for instance, may exceed an
arbitrary set of the eight preferences of the NHS. It may include development as a value when economic and social rights are concerned, or
the equality of access, rather than security, as a value when hydrogen
bomb testing was questioned;355 or, it may include the equilibrium of
military means on a large scale when the relationship between the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons and military necessity is in
question. It may even include reproductive rights, contrary to McDougal’s (or rather McNamara’s) unfounded Neo-Malthusian thesis about
the growth of population as the greatest threat to human rights.356 In
Id.

355 See generally McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests, supra note 37, at 686.
McDougal justified the legality of the hydrogen bomb test in the high seas with an argument for security given the threat posed by totalitarianism.
356 See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human
Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of
Human Dignity 40 (1980) [hereinafter McDougal et al., Human Rights and World
Public Order]. The authors quote McNamara:
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the same way that the values relevant to policy-making in a particular
context may vary from those relevant in another context, a contextuallygrounded normative framework of inquiry cannot capture the relationship between participants in the world arena and values of human dignity in a binary opposition without proper empirical investigation—an
investigation which would perhaps establish fidelity to such values as a
matter of degree.357 Contrary to McDougal’s contextual framework of
inquiry where a set of predetermined postulated values in practice defines the totality of the context in question, values grounded in context
work holistically in relation to other contextual categories to render a
meaningful configurative policy analysis possible.358
Having evaluated McDougal’s promises of contextualism, I now
turn to the second pragmatist claim of the NHS—problem-solving orientation—to see how it fares in relation to the normative commitments
of Lasswell and McDougal.
IV. The New Haven Jurisprudence and Problem-Oriented
International Law
The previous Part attempted to link the central position of human
dignity in policy science to its contextualist framework of inquiry. I suggested that the unjustified status of values at the center of the policyoriented jurisprudence fatally blunts the contextualist edge of inquiry
so much so that the considerations of those values over-determine the
results of decision-making in a predictable manner unrivaled by semantic foundationalism. In this part, I address the question of the impact of
the normative goals of the New Haven Jurisprudence on its pragmatist,
problem-oriented method of inquiry. I will consider the relationship
between goal or value clarification with other intellectual tasks recommended to the policy science analyst to demonstrate how the NHS’s
treatment of human dignity adversely affects the performance of those
intellectual tasks.
The end desired by the Church and by all men of good will is the enhancement of human dignity. That is what development is all about. Human dignity is threatened by the population explosion—more severely, more completely, more certainly threatened than it has been by any catastrophe the
world has yet endured.
Robert McNamara, One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People: The Dimensions
of Development 46 (1973), quoted in McDougal et al., Human Rights and World
Public Order, supra.
357 See Young, supra note 43, at 69.
358 See id.
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While the futility of contextual-orientation in policy science, as was
argued, is the logical conclusion of the over-determinative role of the
epistemically unjustified value category, it is in fact the performance
rather than the nature of the recommended intellectual tasks, as evidenced by McDougal’s work, which contradicts pragmatic methods required for a policy-oriented jurisprudence. If McDougal had properly
employed any of his own recommended intellectual tasks to corroborate the factual or normative assumptions underlying the New Haven
Jurisprudence, each of the tasks could potentially have aided a problem-solving approach to the world social process. Once the grip of the
postulated value goals on the operation of the NHS’s recommended
intellectual tasks is exposed, the urge for a pragmatic method of inquiry into the justification of normative values presents itself as an alternative difficult to escape.
To avoid the confusion caused by the complementarity and ambiguity inherent in conventional legal rules, a policy-conscious scholar or
decision-maker must take up a series of intellectual tasks to conduct a
configurative inquiry into any problem under consideration.359 In a
policy-oriented inquiry, the performance of these tasks need not follow
a rigid order isolating the tasks from one another.360 When studying
specific questions in context, the policy analyst must employ a configurative approach to synthesize the results compelled by the performance
because each operation draws upon a particular set of skills.361 The five
intellectual tasks developed by Lasswell and adopted by McDougal define the method of inquiry in a directional fashion by postulating a
normative vision for the social world, scientifically assessing the demands and conditions for its realization, investigating the historical
trends relevant to its formation, and projecting a future in which either
the envisioned worldview is realized, or barring that, a viable alternative
vision takes over.362 A vertical thread, however, seems in practice to run
through these various modes of inquiry, shaping up the scientific, historical, and developmental thinking according to the demands of goal
postulates. Liberal optimism, if not determinism, infused into the policy-oriented intellectual tasks, thus, leaves but a chimera of scientific
and historical modes of investigation.

196.

359 See 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 39.
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A. Goal Clarification
At a time when fundamentalism and localism present a real obstacle to intercultural value clarification, the scholar and decision-maker
of international law ought to act differently from elites of smaller
communities who have historically concealed their normative goals in
the obscurity of natural law or “mysticism of historicism or scientism.”363 The policy-oriented jurisprudence, conscious of the fact that
the artifact of law is used instrumentally for social change or stability,
requires that the driving goals for the pursued social consequences be
clarified in unequivocal terms.364 It requires that the observer or decision-maker use a secular technique to clarify the values they envision to
be actualized in an ideal social structure in the future.365 Although goal
clarification hardly dispenses with the wisdom of the past altogether,
because veneration of the past could forestall a vision of change, the
policy-oriented approach rules out “obsessive retrospectivity” in favor of
a variety of methods such as disciplined imagination” and even “free
fantasy techniques.”366 Whatever technique is in use, the overall goals
must be clarified from a universal, as opposed to parochial, observational standpoint and in an empirical, rather than trans-empirical, fashion.367 When “instant Armageddon” is no longer a mere fancy, a policyoriented approach to international law must adopt the goal of minimum order in order to minimize unauthorized coercion, even though
minimum order is always pursued with a view of giving the best approximation to other, more ambitious, social goals.368 The goals of “optimum order” are the overriding goals of human dignity values, the
shared desiderata in the global community.369
Minimum order is attainable when the overarching values of the
worth and dignity of man are realized.370 How precisely the abundance
of values of dignity are widely shared in a community reduces the happenstance of conflicts is what policy science takes to be self-evident. The
presumed, rather than established, link between peace and security on
the one hand, and the realization of the dignity of man on the other, is

197.

363 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
364 See id. at 197–98.
365 Id. at 197.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 198.
368 See id.
369 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at 198.
370 See id.
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nonetheless the outer layer of a deeper American creed—a pragmatic,
liberal faith in necessary progress. It is this faith, rather than disguised
natural law residua or merely some ad hoc arbitrary imposition of discretion, that ultimately explains the unreflective status of values in the
New Haven Jurisprudence.
Not all readers of McDougal who are critical of the status of values
of human dignity at the center of his jurisprudence, and certainly not
McDougal himself, would agree. McDougal insists that the enlightened
intellectual or decision-maker is one who consciously defines her observational standpoint and accordingly clarifies or postulates goal values not based on “faith” or “logical (syntactical) systems [which] are
ambiguous in empirical reference unless they are explicitly related to
observation,” but rather by empirical verification.371 The epistemic implications of the inquirer’s standpoint will be most manifest and considered in scientific thinking. McDougal strives to maintain a comprehensive naturalism of discourse by an overbearing emphasis on the
importance of eschewing logical or trans-empirical methods and adopting empiricism to establish value postulates.372 The NHS, however, fails
to offer any considerable exemplar of an empirical inquiry into its goal
postulates.
To avoid an absolute or a priori system of value-variables, McDougal vehemently insists on an ever-increasing, common trend of rising
demands for certain values worldwide, manifested in the national constitutions as well as the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.373 Given that these demands are made in “different levels
of abstraction and with little systematic ordering,” the intellectual task
of goal clarification must use the highest level of systematization (eight
value categories) which is comprehensive and applicable to any particular context by using appropriate “operational indices.”374 Yet the high
level of systematization of the eight categories has not been supplemented with additional values throughout McDougal’s work such that
371 See 2 id. at 759–63.
372 See 1 id. at 315.
373 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 198; Myres S.
McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 Nat. L.F.
72, 77 (1956); Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C.K. Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 Yale L.J. 60, 61 (1949) (“It is for
values such as these [eight values] that men have always framed constitutions, established
governments, and sought that delicate balancing of power and formulation of fundamental principle necessary to preserve human rights against all possible aggressors, governmental and other.”).
374 McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 189.
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the list would no longer be exhaustive,375 in the same way that operational indices have done little more than apply the eight staple value
categories to a particular discourse. So despite an empirical façade,376
systematization remains little more than the categorization of abstract
preferences, indices little more than the translation of such preferences
in context, and goal clarification tantamount to a declaration of fidelity
to certain values. Read in this light, goal clarification is therefore more
a psychoanalytical exercise for the inquirer than an epistemic obligation.
Lasswell and Kaplan make a stronger claim that these desired
events are common to human nature, though different cultures afford
them varying degrees of importance: “No generalizations can be made a
priori concerning the scale of values of all groups and individuals. What
the values are in a given situation must in principle be separately determined for each case [through specific empirical inquiry].”377 Except for
citing a few domestic and international manifestos, hardly any empirical
inquiry has been carried out to support the claim that there is a universal demand for the eight chosen values or to justify an assumption of
parity in their desirability as constitutive of a democratic society.378 The
375 See id. McDougal notes:
The highest level systemization and description we have proposed is in terms
of the eight values: power, respect, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, and rectitude, and we have offered brief, initial definitions. By the
giving of further appropriate operational indices to these terms, they may be
made both completely comprehensive and sufficiently detailed for any particular investigation.
Id.

376 As Arthur Brodbeck puts it when speaking of the absence of scientific warrant in
policy science’s value system:
[T]he resulting set of abstract terms does not strike us as authoritatively binding for science. Since it is possible to smuggle in hidden postulates by the way
one chooses Categories to form a set . . . . Many feel, for instance, that it is
wrong to see legal institutions as more highly governed by “power” than by
“rectitude,” or to see art as more highly governed by “skill” than by “enlightenment” (bypassing as this does the whole history of the idea of beauty in
human affairs), or to see religion as more governed by “rectitude” than it is
by a sense of love that clearly does not fit into any one of the categories, certainly not the category of “affection” as formulated.
Brodbeck, supra note 282, at 245.
377 Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society, supra note 243, at 56.
378 As Terry Nardin suggests:
The clarification of values is supposed to be a purely empirical activity uninfluenced by preconceived moral principles, but at the same time certain values are
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NHS’s claim to a natural view of ethics lacking a proper, warranting empirical inquiry, it must be noted, is not unique to policy science. Nor
does it in and of itself confirm traces of natural law or arbitrary preferences of the masters of Yale’s jurisprudence. To find marks of natural
law in the New Haven Jurisprudence would demand a canvassing of the
intellectual background and heritage of its founders—a task yet to be
fulfilled by any critic of New Haven’s jurisprudence. The accusation of
arbitrary preferences, however, derives from a negation rather than an
affirmation because most critics find themselves bound to conclude that
absent any justification for values, they must be the result of some arbitrary preferences of Lasswell and McDougal.379
excluded from the empirical canvas because they are morally offensive. The
contradiction is evident. Policy-oriented jurisprudence must be guided by values
that are neither transcendentally derived nor, McDougal’s own evidence and
arguments suggest, universally shared. In the end, therefore, the value of human dignity is simply, postulated.
Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States 204 (1983); see Julius
Stone, Approaches to the Notions of International Justice, in The Future of the Legal Order
372, 450 (Richard Falk & Cyril Black eds., 1969) (arguing that the real difficult choice
between values arises for the decision-maker just when the list has been offered, as not all
the values could be equally secured either in general or in a particular context).
379 This is not to discount the valuable insights offered by some of the critical assessments of the NHS’s value system. The most sophisticated of these accounts is presented by
David Little in Toward Clarifying the Grounds of Value-Clarification: A Reaction to the PolicyOriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 451 (1974). Little begins
with the reasons Lasswell and McDougal give for the essential importance of value clarification, that is, to facilitate the implementation of these values as constitutive of a democratic commitment, and to ensure rationality in decision-making—what McDougal calls “the
quest for ‘rationality.’” McDougal, International Law and Social Science, supra note 86, at 80.
Given that Lasswell and McDougal deliberately refrain from offering any justification for
what they introduce as values of human dignity, Little believes these values could be taken
either as mere postulates lying beyond rational justification, or as self-justifying or selfevident. In the former case, supplying rational justification for values is impossible and
irrelevant; in the latter case, while further justification would be useful, it would only illuminates why such values are self-justifying and thus unavoidable. See Little, supra, at 453.
Little finds evidence for fluctuating between these two positions in policy science, but he
unequivocally adopts the latter view, arguing for a strong link in the New Haven Jurisprudence between self-evident values of human dignity and rationality, in the sense that since
these values guarantee a space for decision-making free from frustration or coercion and
provide the widest distribution of free choice and dignity, their adoption is considered to
be necessary or unavoidable for any rational decision-maker. See id. at 454.
The ingenuity of Little’s analysis is in linking the status of values to an important distinction that Lasswell, and thus McDougal, makes between principles of content and principles of procedure. Principles of content relate to the objects and states of affairs desired
by individuals as a result of dispositional and environmental factors, and are not subject to
rational justification. The content of values is a causal and not a rational matter; it would
be a mistake to try to justify rationally what is empirically or accidentally determined. See
id. at 455. Individuals can control these values first by distancing themselves from the val-
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The NHS’s evasion of the justification of values can best be understood when read against the flaws plaguing Dewey’s pragmatic view of
value and ethics.380 In an attempt to break away from a fact/value distinction and at the same time reject the “empirical theory of values”
which takes what is enjoyed and a value to be one and the same, Dewey’s
concern is to distinguish between de facto and de jure statements, that is,
between the desired and the desirable.381 If “X is desirable” is to be taken as a de jure statement, it would have to mean “X ought to be desired”,
rather than merely “X is consistently desired.”382 Morton White believes
that Dewey’s naturalist view has not been successful in showing how “X is
desirable” possesses any more de jure quality than “X is desired.”383 White
reads Dewey to suggest that the distinction between “a report of immediate sensation” and “an objective property of a thing” finds an analogue
in value judgments as well.384 Therefore, as in the statements, “X looks
red to me now,” “X is (really) red,” and “X is really red = for any normal
person Y, if Y looks at X under normal conditions, X looks red to Y”, in
value judgments the analogue to such statements would be: “X is desired
by me now,” “X is really desirable,” and “X is desirable = for any normal
person Y, if Y looks at X under normal conditions, X is desired by Y.”385
White convincingly questions if the third sentence in each pair has any
more de jure quality than the second ones—that is, whether X being desirable to Y under normal conditions gives any sharper normative edge
to X being really desired.386 If “X is desirable” is no more de jure than “X
ues and consciously clarifying them, and then manipulating them toward the realization of
preferred events by a systematic operationalization of their content. This is performed by
using principles of procedure that are entirely rational. See id. at 456. Little uncovers a
confusion in Lasswell and McDougal’s language and argues that the principles of rationality cannot intelligibly be said to be empirically grounded, because those principles should
stand as the frame of mind that “is imposed on the empirical data in order to make sense of
it.” Id. at 457. Further, to the extent that value judgments are constituted based on principles and conditions of rationality, they also cannot be seen as empirically grounded. So
rather than avoid the questions and problems that “speculative” or “trans-empirical” or
“merely logical” philosophy has traditionally entertained, Lasswell and McDougal land
precisely in the middle of the problematique. See id. Little goes on to find the Kantian
solution to this conundrum more successful than the NHS’s evasion of the question altogether. See id. at 458–60.
380 See Morton White, Essays and Reviews in Philosophy and Intellectual History 155 (1973) (critiquing the Deweyan naturalist view of value and ethics).
381 See id. at 156.
382 See id. at 157.
383 Id. at 160.
384 See id. at 160–61.
385 Id. at 159–60.
386 See White, supra note 380, at 160.

2012]

Pragmatism and the NHS’s International Law of Human Dignity

135

is really red,” then it is hard to see how “X is desirable” is more than “X is
desired.”387 Stated another way, “X is really red” if looked at under normal conditions does not mean “X ought to look red” in a moral sense,
and nor does “X is desirable” if looked at under normal conditions.388
So if “X is desirable” is no more de jure than “X is desired,” Dewey has not
succeeded in showing how “desirable” could mean “ought to be desired.”389
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey seeks to establish the possibility of
scientific verification not just for what is desirable, but also for what
ought to be desired.390 Just as “normal conditions,” which Dewey sometimes calls “laboratory conditions,” are the testing platform for attributing any characteristics to objects, the desired can be equated with the
desirable only under certain ascertainable conditions (whether of a sociological or circular character is unclear). Likewise, Lasswell, and by
way of intellectual association, McDougal, considers the desired values
of human dignity to be what ought to be the normative goal of a jurisprudence for any democratic society, with the addition of a further defect that, despite fervent claims to the contrary, policy science falls
short of offering any evidence to ascertain the desired in the first
place.391 Some object to the universalizing claims of the NHS, arguing
that the parochial nature of its democratic values of human dignity reflects American values,392 but this concern should be secondary to the
greater imperfection of assuming, rather than establishing, consensus,
or the possibility thereof, about the desirable, whether domestically or
on the international level.393
387 See id.
388 See id.
389 See id. at 161.
390 See id. at 155–56.
391 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 91 (postulating human dignity as a desired value without regard to derivation or justification).
392 See, e.g., A.R. Blackshield, The Policy Science Approach to Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Legal and Sociological Concepts of Lasswell and McDougal 8 (Australian Soc’y
of Legal Philosophy, Working Paper No. 5, (1964)).
393 In this respect, compare Lasswell’s view of values with another behaviorist, Paul
Kecskemeti. In contrast to Lasswell, Kecskemeti, attentive to the complexity of reaching
consensus on “higher values” in any social setting, also seeks the possibility of rational consensus. So far as values are concerned, however, he rejects that such a consensus could be
based on strictly scientific grounds. The alternative for Kecskemeti is not the rejection of a
rational value discourse, but rather to suggest that those engaged in a discourse on “higher
values” inevitably adopt certain postulates to serve as the framework for subsequent discourse. What is important, however, is that according to Kecskemeti, the rejection of such
postulates does not involve a logical contradiction or a factual error. Nevertheless, it has
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It is a faith in “human perfectibility” and in the propitious potential of the progressive age that draws policy science to the promotion of
human dignity:
By taking human dignity as our central focus, we are in step
with the ideal values of the American tradition, and with the
progressive ideologies of our epoch. Liberalism and socialism
are united in affirming the free man’s commonwealth as a
goal of human society. That man’s dignity is not to be realized
in this world is the principal forecast of whoever takes a dim
view of human perfectibility.394
This view of human perfectibility, as Bernard Crick agrees, sets
Lasswell apart from both the natural law tradition or “the self-evident
propositions of 1776.”395 Those who possess “a dim view of human perfectibility” are considered “moral mavericks.”396 The problem is that
Lasswell and McDougal do little to show that “moral mavericks” empirically may not outnumber the enlightened optimists.
It appears that while Dewey’s natural view of values and ethics suffers from a genuine flaw in moving from “desired” to “ought to be desired,” and is thus unable to provide a sufficient ground for values,
Lasswell’s presentation of values as mere preferences tries to temporarily
evade the problem of the justification of normativity.397 To shape preferences such that certain events are viewed as what ought to be desired
is left to the field of individual and social psychology, as Lasswell’s attention to the role of propaganda manifests. The obligation of goal clarification incumbent on the scholar or decision-maker is a deep psychoanalytical exercise to clarify all dispositional and environmental ele-

the “stringent consequence” that the agnostic cannot meaningfully participate in the social
setting that the standard defines. Neither the details of Kecskemeti’s argument, nor the
flaws plaguing that argument are of importance here. What distinguishes Kecskemeti’s
view of values from that of Lasswell’s, despite their shared behaviorism, is that Kecskemeti
believes it is possible to achieve a consensus on “higher values,” even though the conditions of that discourse cannot be closely checked by scientific criteria. See generally Paul
Kecskemeti, Meaning, Communication, and Value (1952).
394 Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Time, supra note 250.
395 Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics, Its Origins and Conditions
196 (1959). Earlier in the same volume, Crick is hesitant to reject the possibility of a “continued implicit” adherence to the tradition of “natural rights” by Lasswell. See id. at 192.
396 See McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy, supra note 3, at 212.
397 See White, supra note 380, at 160; McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 189.
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ments that make up the aggregate objectives that are pursued in decision-making.398
Lasswell’s individualism and reliance on psychology aside, in the
post-philosophical framework of policy science, the NHS’s values in
practice do not epistemically live up to the verification standards of
empirical science, and thus remain non-cognitive. The other contemplative and manipulative methods of New Haven’s problem-solving inquiry—presented as intellectual tasks for a policy-oriented jurisprudence—do little more to address the epistemic status of postulated
goals. The NHS instead carries out these tasks in a manner that best
reinforces the value postulates of human dignity.
B. Trend Thinking
The problem-solving approach here is a historical one. The study
focuses on past trends towards or away from postulated goals to systematically understand how past practices have approximated those
goals.399 The policy-oriented international lawyer bears a great responsibility to use “a comprehensive cognitive map”400 in order to avoid any
impressionistic or anecdotal use of the past “in terms of isolated tidbits
of doctrine and practice.”401 This is in fact a methodological tool that,
in a naturalistic view of values, could at least provide historical proof for
“the desired.” It could also test the continuity of the “desired” events or
preferences (and as such their desirability, albeit without establishing
any de jure status more than the historical continuity of the demand):
“Having postulated the overriding goal of human dignity on the most
inclusive possible scale, the principal questions to be answered are
whether values are becoming more abundant and more widely shared,
and whether institutional practices are more or less well-adapted to the
requirements of the fundamental objective.”402
The recommended historical approach seems in theory to avoid
the two extremes of historical pitfalls: the objectivity mirage and the exile to the island of pure subjectivity. Lasswell and McDougal are clear
that the policy relevance of trend thinking is that “trend knowledge discloses the degree of congruence or discrepancy between preference and
398 See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 157, at 189.
399 See, e.g., Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 15.
400 See id.
401 1 McDougal & Lasswell, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 7, at
36–37.
402 2 id. at 787.
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fact.”403 But the inquirer nevertheless consciously carries a myriad set of
preferences into the reconstruction of facts depending on context.404
McDougal’s operationalization of trend thinking, which is largely
presented in the context of human rights, however, leaves much to be
desired in objectivity. A Marxist reading of McDougal’s description of
the development of human rights in connection with the culture of
cities, for instance, reveals the frailty of his historical claim.405 His progressive reading of the history of urban life and “the respect revolution”
happily concludes with a hymn that “in the interdependent urbanizing
globe, the continual reclustering of conditioning factors has had the
net effect of moving the world community towards articulating and attaining the principles of a respect revolution in the name of human
dignity and an international public and civic order of human rights.”406
Chimni exposes McDougal’s simplistic portrayal of the “respect revolution” as the contribution of capitalism and its total disregard for the
unequal distributive effect of colonialism and neo-colonialism.407
It is worth emphasizing that to concur with critiques of McDougal’s actual performance of trend thinking does not mean that a disciplined historical inquiry would respond to the need for a firm epistemic basis for the normative values at the center of a policy-oriented
jurisprudence. It merely, and primarily, suggests that given the lack of
empirical grounds for values in demand in Yale’s jurisprudence, proper

403 Id.
404 Some students of the NHS are at times clear on this point:
[O]bjectivity cannot be achieved by simply collecting facts and presuming
that they speak for themselves. Facts are not events; they are often the conclusions the observer has drawn from observing events. How the observer collects
the facts necessary for his inquiry and how he establishes the causal relationship among them cannot be answered without some preconceptions as to the
events he is observing and the goals he seeks.
Suzuki, supra note 5, at 15.
405 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 127–28.
406 See McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 427–28.
407 Chimni, supra note 151, at 128. Chimni quotes a passage from Ronald Dworkin,
that “the pragmatist will pay whatever attention to the past as is required by good strategy,”
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 162 (1986), to attribute the New Haven’s manipulative
treatment of history to pragmatism. See Chimni, supra note 151, at 128. Such a view of
pragmatism is merely as simplistic as McDougal’s performance of historical inquiry. It
would take us too far afield to elaborate on pragmatism and historical inquiry. It suffices
here to mention that Chimni’s reading of Dworkin is out of context, as Dworkin’s opposition to pragmatism is here limited to legal interpretation.
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historical inquiry can only scrutinize to what degree those demands
have been “approximated.”
C. Scientific Thinking
All of the contemplative and manipulative intellectual tasks of policy science facilitate the realization of the postulated goals. They are
integrative, in that they are not marked by any order of priority or strict
lines of division. The recommended scientific method of analyzing
conditioning factors is to enrich the description of trends by eliminating the possibility of mere happenstance and establishing warranted
causation between past decisions and preferences.408 It is incumbent on
the inquirer here to define a clear “observational standpoint” with regards to any social process in context.409 Defining an observational
standpoint does not mean for the intellectual to passively situate oneself in one’s surroundings, but rather, requires that she adopt a conscious social position with regard to those surrounding elements.410 It is
vital for the legal scholar to be able to travel between an external and
an internal standpoint.411 When engaged with “theory about law,” it is
essential for the scholar to take distance from participants in the legal
process under investigation, and when studying “theories of law” to
look with the view of a participant observer.412
McDougal’s sharp demarcation between the external and internal
positions sets him apart not only from positivists,413 but also from Lon
Fuller’s sympathizing observer with professional participants,414 from
Max Weber’s sociologist who should define an outside standing lest
“the juristic precision of judicial opinions . . . be impaired” if sociological, ethical, or economic grounds were to replace “legal concepts,”415
from Eugene Ehrlich’s Professor of Law who inevitably brings “norms

408 See McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 206.
409 See id. at 199.
410 See id.
411 See id. at 200.
412 See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Trends in Theories About Law:
Maintaining Observational Standpoint and Determining the Focus of Inquiry, 8 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1;
McDougal et al., Theories About International Law, supra note 30, at 199–200.
413 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 74 (describing exclusive focus on officials and state actors as “the fatal weakness of the
positivist approach”).
414 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 106–07 (1964).
415 Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 11 (Max Rheinstein et al. eds.,
1968).
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that are being taught” into “the science of norms,”416 from Karl Llewellyn’s jurisprudential work addressed to the “individual case” as opposed to the sociologist who addresses himself to the “comforting
sweep of the decades,”417 and from the later Llewellyn who attempts to
“bridge between sociology and the legal.”418 The difference lies in the
fact that McDougal wishes to break the legal professional image by assigning an external observer role to the scholar of enlightenment as
she draws on the trend of past decisions and employs the tools of social
science to study empirically the causal relationship of those decisions
and preferred events.419 This is one step further from most realists,420
who in the latter life of legal realism were concerned with maintaining
a balance within the professional outlook of the law—Llewellyn’s
reckon-ability being one such attempt.421
If McDougal targets the internal professional image of the law,
however, he replaces it with another professional image—the professional image of the policy science scholar of enlightenment.422 The
modesty of objectivity that McDougal expects to infuse into the external observational standpoint is not only apparent in his own admission
to the presence of identity attachments in any detached scholar,423 but
416 Eugene Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 364 (1936).
417 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 6 (1960).
418 Karl Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1355, 1356 (1940).
419 Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 362, 379–83 (1970) [hereinafter McDougal & Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About
Law].
420 An exception is Bingham, whose views in this regard parallel those of McDougal.
See, e.g., Joseph W. Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912).
421 See generally Llewellyn, supra note 417, at 178–208 (exploring the limits and laws
of ideas that can be reckoned through reason). My analysis of the difference between
McDougal’s approach and other jurisprudential approaches on the question of observational standpoint here closely follows that of William Morison. See Morison, supra note 23,
at 5–13.
422 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 369 (defining role of scholar in terms of “professional responsibility”).
423 For example, McDougal addressed the Law of the Sea Institute as follows:
In these remarks, I shall be speaking as a professor, somewhat pedantically
lecturing you; this is my vocation, it is my style. I assure you that I do this with
no arrogance, but in all humility. Similarly, I cannot divorce myself from the
fact that I am a United States national. I do not think any healthy man can escape identifying with his own national community, as well as with larger
communities of which it is a member. I have deep roots in the communities of
many of you here today. I have taught students from other countries, both at
my home and abroad, for over thirty years. Insofar as I can, I intend to try to
deal with these problems from the perspectives of citizens of the larger whole
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also in the fact that the legal scholar as the policy scientist of democracy
is first and foremost expected to define his standpoint with regards to
value goals of human dignity before the scientific task begins.424 Maintaining a credible observational standpoint is as commendable as it is
difficult, if there is an overbearing commitment to some postulated
values that distinguish policy scientists of democracy from those of tyranny. The NHS sets up the scholar for the impossible task of maintaining an objective observational standpoint, while it simultaneously urges
fidelity to some normative commitments in the form of postulates on
the international lawyer of human dignity.
D. Developmental Thinking
Once the historical and scientific investigations clarify the past
trend of events and the formation and distribution of values, the scholar performs a projective task to hypothesize the probable future
trends.425 This is a detailed analytical exercise in which the policy scientist examines the change, continuity, or orderly fluctuation of factors to
predict an identifiable trend and, accordingly, tailor policy decisions
toward the realization of predicted future events and preferences.426
Lasswell develops an intellectual tool called “developmental construct”
to address the projective task.427 Such a prediction of realistic possibilities is necessary for the performance of the policy scientists’ more creative responsibility to manipulate the course of events toward the preferred social vision.428
Developmental inquiry, Lasswell’s debt to Marx, nonetheless bears
no deterministic implications. The policy scholar of enlightenment
projects a future based on the empirically established trends of the

of mankind. If you prefer, let us adopt the perspectives of the anthropologist
who tries to observe both common and special interests and to clarify a common interest. If I fail in this, I would suggest that this is an exercise which all
of us should be continually trying.
Myres S. McDougal, Commentary, in The Law of the Sea, supra note 34, cited in Tipson,
supra note 31, at 232.
424 See McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 90–91.
425 See Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 68.
426 Cf. id. at 67–68 (utilizing the Marxist model of social progress to predict and influence future development).
427 See id. at 67.
428 See id. at 68–69.
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past.429 On one extreme, there is the optimistic construct with increasing interdependence, advancement of science and technology, and
clarification and promotion of human dignity by intellectuals, while on
the other extreme there is the garrison state, increasing militarization,
concentration of wealth, erosion of individual liberties, and the concentration and censoring of information.430 These extremes are consistent with the postulated normative vision of the NHS and are not warranted by the results of New Haven’s deficient historical and scientific
methods of inquiry.431 Thus, the projective task is merely a blithely convenient affirmation of the envisioned worldview of policy science, albeit
alluringly cloaked in scientific fallibilism.
E. Alternative Thinking
Because Lasswell, and thus McDougal, eschew a deterministic view
of history, they equip the policy scientist with proper tools to manipulate
events, should the projected future, despite all warranting evidence, appear unrealistic.432 This is a manipulative and integrative task with a goal
to maximize effectiveness with minimum dislocation.433 In “integrative”
solutions, all participants gain, and thus conflicts among potential losers
would be avoided.434 One of the techniques to foster realism together
with creativity is to manipulate (shape or modify) the perspectives of the
people of the world for an accelerated achievement of the objectives of
the world public order of human dignity: “It is hardly a novel insight
that the factors—culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis—which
importantly condition peoples’ perspectives can be modified to foster
constructive rather than destructive perspectives.”435
Aside from the naivety embedded in the assumption about a situation in which the distribution of the maximum would leave no losers,
429 McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, at
92–93.
430 Id. at 438–39.
431 See Chimni, supra note 151, at 134–36 (providing more specific examples of McDougal’s simplistic projection of the future); cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World
Public Order, supra note 356, at 438–39 (assuming, in the optimistic construct, that scholars
will continue to advance human dignity).
432 See McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 92–93.
433 See id. at 93.
434 Cf. McDougal & Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, supra note 419, at 392 (advocating integrative solutions to maximize gains and minimize losses).
435 McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356, at
443.
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even judged from the standpoint of the underlying economic premises
of Lasswell’s maximization postulate,436 and the elitist implications of
policing perspectives through the creative intelligence of intellectuals,
the realistic view that may be gained as a result of the failure of the initial “developmental construct” does not alter the unrelenting reign of
the unjustified values of human dignity.437 Failing the scholar’s projected view of the future, she does not take a step back to reevaluate the
desirability of the postulated values, but rather persists to homogenize
the perspectives of the public (or rather those of the decision-making
elites) in a therapeutic manner.438 Meanwhile, in practice, the postulated goals of the dignity of man curb any potential methodological
significance that historical and scientific tasks might bear for a more
realistic policy-oriented approach. The rigid application of human dignity consistent with the values of the New Haven masters fatally neutralizes any emancipatory opportunities that developmental and alternative thinking could provide to change the status quo.
Conclusion
This Article presents a new understanding of the New Haven Jurisprudence and a novel assessment of its pragmatist promises. The
NHS, the most creative project of disciplinary renewal in the midtwentieth century, is like the elephant under the touch of men in the
dark. Yale’s policy-oriented international law has been understood, inter
alia, to legitimize U.S. imperialism and to cause the demise of law, to be
no more than pseudo-scientific jargon, and to represent pragmatist
thinking in international law. One commentator refuses to recognize
the NHS as jurisprudence, but nevertheless states that an understanding of modern international law scholarship depends upon an understanding of Yale’s policy science.439
Critical and admiring reactions to the NHS implicitly or explicitly
identify Yale’s policy thinking with American pragmatism. Explicit accounts of New Haven’s pragmatism number only a handful and their
analyses are both mistaken about pragmatism and unfair to Yale’s sophisticated configurative jurisprudence. Instead of presenting a scheme
436 See, e.g., Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, supra note 158, at 18–20 (assuming that individuals seek to maximize their values by utilizing institutions that affect
resources to achieve preferred outcomes).
437 Cf. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, supra note 356,
at 90–91 (basing explicitly their analysis in human dignity as a promoted goal).
438 See id. at 439–40; 443–44.
439 See Leiter, supra note 21, at 379.
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of philosophical markers of pragmatism, this Article examines two central pragmatist claims of the NHS and assesses their pragmatist potential in light of the dominant, determinative role of postulates of human
dignity in legal decision-making. The central argument is that the
NHS’s antifoundationalism reverts to a foundationalism of its own as it
grants an over-determining role for legal outcomes to a set of values
parochial to the New Haven masters. In doing so, Lasswell and McDougal’s foundationalist antifoundationalism fatally blunts New Haven’s
promises of contextualism and problem-solving creativity.
Understanding New Haven’s foundationalist pragmatism in light
of the internal dynamic between values of human dignity and promises
of contextualism and problem-solving orientation enables us to see beyond the fog of the accusations of the NHS’s legitimization of power or
affinity with natural law. It also opens the door for a more nuanced appreciation of philosophical pragmatism and its possible contribution to
policy thinking in international law in the twenty-first century.
Whether the NHS adopted American pragmatism and impaired its
antifoundationalism with a normative foundationalism of its own, or
the tradition of pragmatism itself has never entirely escaped foundationalism is a historical question beyond the scope of this paper. Once
we acknowledge the inherently contradictory nature of New Haven’s
foundationalist pragmatism, however, we are in a position to evaluate
the career of the policy-oriented approach and its promises for policy
creativity more accurately and with sympathy.

